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NOTES 
The Constitution, the Legislature, and Unfair Surprise: 
Toward a Reliance-Based Approach to the Contract Clause 
Robert A. Graham 
INTRODUCTION 
During the first eighty years of the Republic, the Contract Clause1 
was the constitutional rule most frequently invoked to strike down 
state legislation. 2 Private parties successfully cited the clause's pro-
hibition in challenges to impairments of land grants,3 corporate char-
ters,4 and private debts.5 After a period of somewhat reduced 
activity,6 however, the Contract Clause fell into disuse between 1934 
and 1977. 7 It enjoyed a brief renaissance in the late 1970s, 8 but more 
recent Contract Clause challenges to state legislation have met with 
limited, if any, success.9 
Over the course of our constitutional history, the Supreme Court's 
focus in Contract Clause jurisprudence has shifted from a concern for 
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 ("No State shall ... pass any •.. Law impairing the 
Obligation of Contracts .... "). Private parties raising Contract Clause challenges may do so in 
an action for declaratory and injunctive relief. E.g., Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 
U.S. 234 (1978); Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473 (1905). Such challenges, however, also may 
arise in actions to quiet title, City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497 (1965), in suits to enforce 
contractual rights, Energy Reserves Group Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400 
(1983), and by way of defense in actions under a challenged statute. Home Bldg. & Loan Assn. 
v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934). 
2. See BENJAMIN F. WRIGHT, JR., THE CONTRACT CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION 51-88 
(1938). 
3. Fletcher v. Peck, IO U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810). 
4. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819). 
5. Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819). 
6. During this time, from just after the Civil War to the 1930s, substantive economic due 
process came into vogue, thereby decreasing the need for the Contract Clause. See Douglas W. 
Kmiec & John 0. McGinnis, The Contract Clause: A Return to the Original Understanding, 14 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 525, 534 (1987). 
7. Id. 
8. See, e.g., Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978) (striking down a law 
impairing pension agreements); United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. I (1977) (strik· 
ing down legislation modifying the state's own obligations). 
9. See, e.g., General Motors Co. v. Romein, 112 S. Ct. 1105 (1992) (holding constitutional 
the application of modified workers' compensation laws to prior claims); Keystone Bituminous 
Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987) (denying Contract Clause protection to surface 
subsidence damage agreements modified by statute); Energy Reserves Group v. Kansas Power & 
Light Co., 459 U.S. 400 (1983) (upholding legislation applied to extant natural gas pricing 
schemes). 
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individual expectations to the protection of the public good.10 The 
Court's early decisions concerning retroactive state statutes11 highlight 
the clause's original purpose of ensuring that states not defeat private 
parties' reliance interests.12 More recent decisions demonstrate the 
Court's departure from the reliance standard.13 In addressing Con-
tract Clause challenges today, the Court weighs the competing state 
and private interests.14 In doing so, the Court asks whether the law at 
issue substantially impairs the individual's contractual rights, whether 
the law is intended to serve a significant and legitimate public purpose, 
and whether the means utilized by the government to effect that pur-
pose are reasonable and necessary.15 Further, the Court now takes a 
less deferential stand than it once did toward legislative determina-
tions of reasonableness and necessity when the state is a party to the 
impaired contract.16 
10. See infra Part I. 
11. "Retroactive" statutes are those laws that affect private rights created through contracts 
entered into before the enactment of the law. One commentator describes the interaction be-
tween new law and past and continuing transactions as "vested rights retroactivity." See W. 
David Slawson, Constitutional and Legislative Considerations in Retroactive Lawmaking, 48 CAL. 
L. REv. 216, 218 (1960) ("If the effect ofa law is substantially to disturb patterns of conduct that 
represent substantial investments in labor or property or to remove valuable rights, rights of 
action or even liberties, then the law is [vested rights retroactive].") (footnotes omitted). 
Slawson contrasts vested rights retroactivity with "method retroactivity." Method retroac-
tivity concerns arise when "laws .•• make rights or duties depend on past events in the narrow 
sense of dependence on events that have occurred and terminated before the laws were enacted." 
Id. at 217. However, he later asserts that the distinction is illusory because in both cases the 
retrospective law affects ongoing rights and claims. Id. at 220. 
Although this Note does not rely on the method versus vested rights dichotomy, the reader 
should be aware that this Note deals primarily with vested rights retroactivity problems. 
12. See, e.g., Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819) 
(striking down a law interfering with a chartering party's expectations); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 
(6 Cranch) 87 (1810) (invalidating a state statute defeating land grant recipients' expectations). 
For a full discussion of these two decisions, see infra notes 40-46 and accompanying text. 
13. See, e.g., Home Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 444-48 (1934) (introduc-
ing a multiple-factored "legitimate ends" test into the Court's determination). 
14. That is, the judiciary determines the relative weight of public and private interests impli-
cated. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 485-86, 505-06 
(1987) (finding that the public interest in preserving a surface owner's property from subsidence 
damage outweighs a mining operator's contractual rights); Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Span-
naus, 438 U.S. 234, 250-51 (1978) (holding that the severity of the contracting parties' impair-
ment outweighs the government's interest in protecting prisoners). Although the Court does not 
explicitly dub its approach a balancing test, numerous commentators have so termed this process 
of identifying and comparing substantiality of impairment and significance of state interests. See, 
e.g., Note, Rediscovering the Contract Clause, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1414, 1415-16 (1984) (discuss-
ing modem Contract Clause jurisprudence); Michael B. Rappaport, Note, A Procedural Ap-
proach to the Contract Clause, 93 YALE L.J. 918, 919-22 (1984) (discussing Allied Steel and 
United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977)); Richard G. Taranto, Note, A Process-
Oriented Approach to the Contract Clause, 89 YALE L.J. 1623, 1641-42 (1980) (discussing Allied 
Steel as a balancing case). 
15. See Energy Reserves Group v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 411-13 (1983) 
(setting forth the elements of the Court's current test). For a full discussion of the Court's bal-
ancing factors, see JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 394-407 
(4th ed. 1991). 
16. See United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 30 (1977). 
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From a methodological standpoint, the Court's approach has pro-
gressively limited the scope and meaning of the Contract Clause by 
reading into it various exceptions. From the landmark case of Home 
Building & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdelf 11 through more recent cases,18 
Contract Clause decisions have moved incrementally toward what is 
essentially a test of governmental prerogatives. The current standard 
determines the clause's applicability according to the strength of the 
particular interests a piece of state legislation represents. Through this 
piecemeal approach, over time, the Court has moved away from its 
original concern for contractual expectations and speaks now primar-
ily in terms of state powers and private impairments. 19 This process of 
defining Contract Clause doctrine through a balancing of interests has 
deprived the clause of the clarity it once possessed. 
In two cases from the 1980s,2° however, the Court resurrected a 
modified form of the reliance logic in one factor of its determination. 
This factor is known as the "heavily regulated industry" doctrine 
(HRID). Under this doctrine, when a party conducts business in a 
"heavily regulated" field, the retroactive effects that a new rule im-
poses on that business will survive Contract Clause scrutiny. The doc-
trine assumes that a private actor, in entering a heavily regulated field, 
knows the government exercises a great deal of control over that in-
dustry. The doctrine further assumes that the actor also realizes that 
the legal backdrop against which she conducts business is subject to 
change. Therefore, the private party cannot reasonably expect her op-
erations and relations, as subject to the changing regulatory scheme, to 
remain unaffected by a modification in the law.21 
This Note argues that the Court should return to a reliance-based 
approach to Contract Clause challenges, fashioned loosely along the 
same lines as the HRID. Although it does not advocate that the 
Court revivify the rules created by the early decisions, the Note pro-
poses that the Court look to the private parties' expectations and, 
more specifically, to the reasonableness of those expectations in decid-
ing the clause's applicability to a particular case. Part I provides a 
brief history of the Contract Clause and its development. This Part 
follows the clause from the Constitutional Convention through the 
17. 290 U.S. 398 (1934). 
18. See infra section I.B. 
19. See infra section I.B. 
20. Exxon v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176 (1983); Energy Reserves Group v. Kansas Power & 
Light Co., 459 U.S. 400 (1983). For a full discussion of these two decisions, see infra notes 119-
25 and accompanying text. 
21. "The justification given for this sweeping principle is that the parties are on notice that if 
the legislature has competence in a given field, it may well exercise its powers, and therefore there 
is no unfair surprise when these powers are exercised retroactively." Charles B. Hochman, The 
Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Retroactive Legislation, 73 HARV. L. REV. 692, 700 
(1960). 
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1980s to illustrate the Court's departure over time from the original 
meaning of the clause. Part II discusses the heavily regulated industry 
doctrine and demonstrates how it represents a return to a focus on 
party expectations. Having set forth the theoretical underpinnings of 
the heavily regulated industry doctrine, this Note in Part III extends 
the doctrine's logic to create a modified reliance model for applying 
the Contract Clause. The Part argues that the reasonableness of a 
party's expectations as to the validity or enforceability of her contracts 
varies according to the amount of previous legislation in an area, as 
well as the "publicness" of the party's transactions. This Note con-
cludes that this modified reliance approach has several advantages 
over the Court's current test, including greater continuity with early 
Court precedent and better guidance both for private parties and 
legislatures. 
I. THE COURT'S SHIFf IN PERSPECTIVE 
The Supreme Court's emphasis in its Contract Clause jurispru-
dence has drifted significantly since the Constitution's ratification. 
The clause's early history reflects an overarching theme emphasizing 
private reliance marks.22 Beginning with Home Building & Loan 
Assn. v. Blaisdell23 in 1934, however, the Court has forsaken its origi-
nal focus on party expectations in favor of a more fluid, but less cer-
tain and less predictable, balancing of state power against private 
interests. Ultimately, this shift deprives the Contract Clause of a sin-
gle guiding principle and gives both legislatures and courts more free-
dom than the Framers intended. 24 
This Part illustrates the differences in the Court's treatment of the 
22. This period lasted roughly from the time of the Constitutional Convention to the New 
Deal era. But see Kmiec & McGinnis, supra note 6, at 534. Kmiec and McGinnis identify four 
periods in Contract Clause jurisprudence: 1810-1879, during which the Court vigorously applied 
the clause to strike down state legislation; 1879-1934, during which the clause fell into disuse 
while economic substantive due process enjoyed broad application; 1934-1977, when the Court 
substantially narrowed the purview of the clause, thereby rendering it "a virtual nullity"; and 
1977 through the present, during which time the Court has increased scrutiny of state legislation, 
without a single coherent approach. See id. Although this Note does not dispute Kmiec and 
McGinnis' four-period model, the Note departs from this model because the Court's methodol-
ogy, though not its application of the clause to particular cases, remains constant between peri-
ods one and two and between periods three and four. In light of this Note's focus on 
methodology, the distinction between these periods is insignificant. 
23. 290 U.S. 398 (1934). 
24. See, e.g., Kmiec & McGinnis, supra note 6, at 526. The current absence of a single 
guiding principle has drawn criticism in academic circles. Kmiec and McGinnis, for instance, 
note: 
It is ironic that the Supreme Court has chosen to apply the Contract Clause by balancing 
social interests in the manner of the legislature when the intent of the Clause was to forbid 
legislatures from retrospectively interfering with contracts. It is equally ironic that the 
Supreme Court has interpreted a constitutional provision that was designed to provide cer-
tainty to contracting parties in a manner that maximizes the unpredictability of its 
application. 
Id. at 559. 
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Contract Clause from the time of the Constitution's ratification 
through the present. It further indicates some of the weaknesses of the 
Court's current test. Section I.A discusses the clause's early history 
and its original aim of protecting individuals' reasonable reliance inter-
ests. Section I.B examines the Supreme Court's more recent treatment 
of Contract Clause challenges and illustrates the Court's change in 
perspective over time. This section argues that the doctrinal shift from 
protection of party expectations leaves individuals without standards 
by which to judge the wisdom of entering into particular transactions. 
Such an effect is particularly perverse in light of the Contract Clause's 
purpose of providing stability in private contracts. This departure also 
permits a lack of discipline on the part of both courts and legislatures 
in determining the wisdom and constitutionality of a given piece of 
legislation. 
A. Early History: Focus on Party Expectations 
An examination of the preratification history of the Contract 
Clause demonstrates that the Framers• purpose in including the clause 
was to protect contracting parties from the unfair surprise25 wrought 
by state legislatures.26 Although the Contract Clause was not the sub-
ject of heavy debate in the Constitutional Convention,27 the records of 
the Framers and the contemporaneous public discussion reveal an in-
tent to protect contracting parties' expectations by prohibiting legisla-
tive interference with those expectations.28 The clause derives from a 
portion of the Ordinance of the Northwest Territory providing that no 
law "shall in any manner whatever interfere with, or affect private 
contracts or engagements, bona fide, and without fraud previously 
formed ... 29 The purpose of the quoted enactment was the "just preser-
vation of rights and property.'•3o 
Unfortunately, unlike the Ordinance, the Contract Clause as rati-
fied includes no statement of intent. Further, the debate in the Federal 
Convention centered more on the wisdom of the rule the clause em-
25. This Note uses "unfair surprise" to indicate the defeat of a reasonable expectation. It 
does not intend the term to be a qualitative judgment. 
26. See Bernard Schwartz, Old Wine in Old Bottles? The Renaissance of the Contract Clause, 
1979 SUP. Cr. REv. 95, 96-97 (discussing the historical and theoretical bases of the clause). 
27. "If a study of the social and political context of the clause reveals little about the inten-
tions of the framers, not much more is to be gleaned from the historical accounts of the debates 
at the drafting and ratifying conventions." Richard A. Epstein, Toward a Revitalization of tlte 
Contract Clause, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 703, 706 (1984). 
28. See THE FEDERALIST No. 44 (James Madison); James Madison, Journal (Aug. 28, 
1787), in THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 439 (Max Farrand ed., 
1911). 
29. An Ordinance for the Government of the Territory of the United States north-west of the 
river Ohio, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 51, 52 (1789). 
30. 1 Stat. 52 (1789). 
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bodies than on its purpose.31 Nonetheless, the ratification debates 
demonstrate a clear intent to preserve "rights and property" from ret-
roactive state legislation. 32 
James Madison provided a detailed discussion of the clause's 
groundings in the Federalist Papers, in which he indicated that the 
clause was intended to create security in private expectations. In Fed-
eralist No. 44, Madison wrote: 
Very properly therefore have the Convention added this constitutional 
bulwark in favor of personal security and private rights; and I am much 
deceived if they have not in so doing as faithfully consulted the genuine 
sentiments, as the undoubted interests of their constituents. The sober 
people of America are weary of the fluctuating policy which has directed 
the public councils. They have seen with regret and with indignation, 
that sudden changes and legislative inferences in cases affecting personal 
rights, become jobs in the hands of enterprizing and influential specula-
tors; and snares to the more industrious and less informed part of the 
community. They have seen, too, that legislative interference, is but the 
first link of a long chain of repetitions; every subsequent interference 
being naturally produced by the effects of the preceding. They very 
rightly infer, therefore, that some thorough reform is wanting which will 
banish speculations on public measures, inspire a general prudence and 
industry, and give a regular course to the business of society.33 
Although some have argued that the "fluctuating policy," "sudden 
changes," and "legislative interferences" to which Madison referred 
consist only of debtor relief laws, 34 the clause's broad language does 
not suggest such a limited reading. 35 Moreover, Madison's own refer-
ence to the Contract Clause as a "constitutional bulwark in favor of 
personal security and private rights" plainly addresses all types of un-
fair retroactive legislation, not merely a narrow segment of such 
laws.36 
Early in its history, the Supreme Court adopted a similar view of 
the Contract Clause and unfair surprise. The Court's early Contract 
Clause decisions hinged on what this Note terms the "traditional reli-
31. See WRIGHT, supra note 2, at 1-12. As Wright indicates, there was little discussion of the 
clause during either the Convention or the ratification process. The issues raised typically con-
cerned whether contractual impairments fell within the purview of the Ex Post Facto Clause, id. 
at 9-10, whether "such a provision would interfere with the passage of necessary legislation relat-
ing to the bringing of actions," id. at 8, and whether the prohibition would prevent states from 
reacting to "great public calamities and distress." Id. at 13. 
32. See Madison, supra note 28, at 440. 
33. THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 301-02 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961); see 
also THE FEDERALIST supra, No. 62 (James Madison), at 418-22 (voicing similar concerns re-
garding the length of Senate terms). 
34. See WRIGHT, supra note 2, at 13-15 (discussing concern for stability of private debts at 
time of ratification). But see Kmiec & McGinnis, supra note 6, at 533-34 (refuting the debtor 
relief theory of clause's purpose). 
35. See Epstein, supra note 27, at 706-07 (discussing the intentional generality of the clause's 
language). 
36. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 33, at 301. 
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ance model."37 In these cases, the Court looked to the private expec-
tations the impaired contract reflected to determine whether a 
Contract Clause violation had occurred. For instance, Chief Justice 
Marshall asserted that impairment of contracts by state legislatures 
had the effect of "break[ing] in upon the ordinary intercourse of soci-
ety, and destroy[ing] all confidence between man and man."38 He also 
opined that such interference "sap[ped] the morals of the people, and 
destroy[ed] the sanctity of private faith."39 
The opinion of the Court in Fletcher v. Peck40 provides a good 
example of the Court's use of the traditional reliance model. In this 
case, the Court struck down a Georgia statute defeating the expecta-
tions of purchasers in the Yazoo land sale. The Georgia act sought to 
nullify land grants by the state legislature that were facilitated by 
"open and wholesale bribery."41 In holding that the law violated the 
Contract Clause, Chief Justice Marshall reasoned that the Framers 
designed the clause to check "the violent acts which grow out of the 
feelings of the moment; and that the people of the United States, in 
adopting that instrument, have manifested a determination to shield 
themselves and their property from the effects of those sudden and 
strong passions to which men are exposed."42 The Court thus posited 
that the Contract Clause's purpose was to protect parties from unex-
pected deprivations of vested rights. 
Still early in the nation's history, the Court in Trustees of 
Dartmouth College v. Woodward 43 found a Contract Clause violation 
by looking to the express intent of the contracting parties.44 This def-
erence to express intent also reflects the Framers' concern for protect-
ing party expectations.45 Chief Justice Marshall, writing for the 
majority, found that the state of New Hampshire's attempt to modify 
the terms of Dartmouth College's charter ran afoul of the Contract 
Clause's prohibition. The Court specifically noted as its guiding prin-
ciple "the necessity and policy of giving permanence and security to 
contracts, [and] of withdrawing them from the influence of legislative 
37. E.g., Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819); 
Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810). The traditional reliance model looks to the 
parties' actual expectations to determine whether the Contract Clause forbids state interference. 
See Taranto, supra note 14, at 1627-29. 
38. Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 354-55 (1827) (Marshall, C.J., dissenting). 
39. 25 U.S. at 354-55. 
40. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810). 
41. WRIGHT, supra note 2, at 21. 
42. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 138. 
43. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819). 
44. The Court determined the parties' express intent by examining the "will of the founder, 
expressed in the charter." Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 
652 (1819). The Court emphasized the founders' intent to demonstrate the presence of an injury 
due to the legislation. 
45. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 648-50. 
November 1993] Note - The Contract Clause 405 
bodies, whose fluctuating policy, and repeated interferences, produced 
the most perplexing and injurious embarrassments."46 
Even the early cases that created limited exceptions to the clause's 
application adopted a view that the clause aimed to protect reasonable 
party expectations. In the eminent domain and police powers cases, 47 
the Court addressed the tension between the state's interest in provid-
ing for the common good and in satisfying private expectations. The 
conflict between these two interests arises when the state seeks by way 
of retroactive legislation to forbid conduct or destroy rights in the 
name of the public welfare. In this context, a court must either thwart 
the state in its efforts to serve its citizenry by preserving the vested 
contractual rights or defeat the private rights by permitting the state 
to execute its policies as the state sees fit. In this line of cases, the 
Court reasoned that individual expectations must yield when in con-
flict with a state's powers.48 It therefore carved out limited exceptions 
to the Contract Clause's broad sweep.49 Yet the Court did not reach 
this result by an ad hoc balancing of the rights and powers at issue in 
each circumstance. Rather, the Court created a rule of contractual 
construction that presumed that party expectations were tempered by 
knowledge of certain of the state's substantive powers, such as its po-
lice and eminent domain powers. 
The first exception to the Contract Clause permitted a state to ex-
ercise its eminent domain power. In West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 50 
the West River Bridge Company challenged a Vermont statute al-
lowing municipalities to take, in the interest of the public good, private 
property to establish public roads.51 In its discussion of the Contract 
Clause question, the Court set forth the competing constitutional rules 
at issue. While acknowledging the importance of the prohibition 
against the impairment of contracts, the Court stated: 
[I]n every political sovereign community there inheres necessarily the 
right and the duty of guarding its own existence, and of protecting and 
promoting the interests and welfare of the community at large .... This 
power, denominated the eminent domain of the State, is, as its name 
imports, paramount to all private rights vested under the government, and 
these last are, by necessary implication, held in subordination to this 
power, and must yield in every instance to its proper exercise. 52 
46. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 648. 
47. See, e.g., Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814 (1880) (addressing police powers); West 
River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507 (1848) (addressing eminent domain power). 
48. See, e.g., Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473, 480-81 (1905) (cataloguing cases supporting 
the view that the state's interest in protecting its citizens is paramount to private contractual 
rights). 
49. See infra notes 50-64 and accompanying text. 
50. 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507 (1848). 
51. 47 U.S. (6 How.) at 530-31. 
52. 47 U.S. (6 How.) at 531-32 (second emphasis added). 
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The Court noted that, despite the Constitution's position as the 
supreme law of the land, a court should not construe the Contract 
Clause to deprive the states of their powers of "self-government and 
self-preservation."s3 Because the eminent domain power fell within 
those powers, the Court upheld the state statute. 
Of particular importance in the Court's decision were the legal ba-
ses upon which property rights rest. Because rights in land within a 
state's boundaries exist only by virtue of state grant and state protec-
tion, every private sale or possession of title in land involves an ele-
ment of state consent. As such, the Court noted: 
[I]nto all contracts, whether made between States and individuals or be-
tween individuals only, there enter conditions which arise not out of the 
literal terms of the contract itself; they are superinduced by the preexist-
ing and higher authority of the laws of nature, of nations, or of the com-
munity to which the parties belong; they are always presumed, and must 
be presumed, to be known and recognized by all, are binding upon all, 
and need never, therefore, be carried into express stipulation, for this 
could add nothing to their force. Every contract is made in subordina-
tion to them, and must yield to their control, as conditions inherent and 
paramount, wherever a necessity for their execution shall occur. s4 
The Court thus read into every property right the implied condition 
that whatever interest may have existed in that property was always 
subject to the state's necessary power to resume possession of that 
property.ss The exception became part of the contract itself. 
This implied term methodology also appeared in the police powers 
cases. In Stone v. Mississippi, s6 the Supreme Court addressed a Con-
tract Clause challenge to legislation revoking a twenty-five-year char-
ter for the operation of a lottery. The post-Civil War provisional 
government in Mississippi had granted the charter, but, one year later, 
the state adopted a new constitution forbidding the authorization of a 
lottery.s7 The central issue in Stone was whether "the legislature of a 
State can, by the charter of a lottery company, defeat the will of the 
people, authoritatively expressed, in relation to the further continu-
ance of such business in their midst."S8 In its analysis, while acknowl-
edging that the limits of the police power are poorly defined, the Court 
stated that the power at least "extends to all matters affecting the pub-
53. 47 U.S. (6 How.) at 532. 
54. 47 U.S. (6 How.) at 532 (emphasis added). 
55. " 'This right of resumption may be exercised, not only where the safety, but also where 
the interest, or even the expediency, of the State is concerned.' " 47 U.S. (6 How.) at 535 (quot-
ing Beekman v. Saratoga & Schenectady R.R., 3 Paige Ch. (N.Y.) 45, 73 (1831)). The breadth of 
this power thus distinguishes it from the police power discussed infra notes 55-63 and accompa-
nying text. 
56. 101 U.S. 814 (1879). 
57. 101 U.S. at 819. 
58. 101 U.S. at 819. 
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lie health or the public morals."59 Because the Court considered lot-
teries and gambling to be included in such matters, it found that they 
were subject to the operation of the police powers. 60 Therefore, the 
Court held the legislation to be valid. 
More important for current purposes is the Court's discussion of 
the inalienable character of the state's police power and how this ina-
lienability creates an implied term in ·all contracts. The majority 
stated that a legislature may not "bargain away" the ability to provide 
for public health, safety, and morals,61 nor can it "divest itself of the 
power to provide for them. "62 By reading into every contract a police 
powers escape clause, the Court exempted statutes affecting the public 
health, safety, and morals from the Contract Clause's prohibition. 
Although it refused to protect actual party expectations in such cir-
cumstances, the Court maintained a focus on reliance. By demanding 
that parties consider the possibility that the state would exercise its 
police powers, the Court did not wholly abandon its traditional reli-
ance model, but rather limited the model by defining an area in which 
reliance on legal stability is inherently unreasonable. 63 In other words, 
the Court required that the party expectations be reasonable in order 
to receive protection. The Court deemed that reasonable expectations 
account for the state's police power.64 
B. Blaisdell and the Court's Shift in Perspective 
In an attempt to expand the limited exemptions embodied in the 
eminent domain and police powers decisions, the Supreme Court in 
the 1934 case Home Building & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdel/ 65 shifted its 
emphasis from party reliance to an examination of state prerogatives. 
Methodologically speaking, the Court abandoned the implied term 
59. 101 U.S. at 818. 
60. 101 U.S. at 818-19. 
61. " 'Irrevocable grants of property and franchises may be made if they do not impair the 
supreme authority to make laws for the right government of the State; but no legislature can 
curtail the power of its successors to make such laws as they may deem proper in matters of 
police.'" 101 U.S. at 817-18 (quoting Metropolitan Bd. of Excise v. Barrie, 34 N.Y. 657 (1866)). 
62. 101 U.S. at 819. 
63. Moreover, given the conditions under which the charter was granted, it is not entirely 
clear that the lottery company did not expect that the charter might be modified. At that time, 
most, if not all, of the states, heavily disfavored lotteries and the U.S. Congress had passed a law 
forbidding the use of the mails for lottery purposes. 101 U.S. at 819. Indeed, up until the time of 
the provisional government, Mississippi had prohibited lotteries. 101 U.S. at 819. The company 
therefore might have foreseen that once the state returned to popular control the state would 
resume its original policy. 
64. The same logic applies in contracts between private parties, not merely in situations in-
volving state-individual relations. See Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473 (1905) (holding that a 
state's grant of a franchise impairing an obligation between the grantee and another private party 
does not run afoul of the Contract Clause when the state takes such action in the exercise of its 
police powers). 
65. 290 U.S. 398 (1934). 
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logic of the earlier cases for an ad hoc balancing test permitting the 
state to exercise its powers irrespective of reasonable expectations, 
constructive or actual. 66 
By way of a four-factor test, Blaisdell67 extended the earlier ex-
emptions from the mere power to provide for health, safety, and 
morals to a broader power to react to other emergencies. Blaisdell 
involved a Minnesota mortgage moratorium law passed to relieve cer-
tain effects of the extant economic depression. 68 In upholding the 
Minnesota law, the Court rested its reasoning on a long examination 
of the historical exercise of the police power and the prerogatives of 
the legislature. 69 The Court cited the rule that the Contract Clause 
will not prevent a legislature from reacting to natural and physical 
disasters, 70 or to scarcity affecting the common weal. 71 The Blaisdell 
Court found that, read together, the decisions permitting such reaction 
represented a "growing recognition of public needs and the relation of 
individual right to public security."72 In light of these "public needs," 
the legislature must have "the capacity ... to protect [the public's] 
fundamental interests," even in the face of vested individual inter-
ests. 73 The Court therefore extended what had been a narrow excep-
tion for the police and eminent domain powers, or "reserved" powers, 
to cover legislation "addressed to a legitimate end. " 74 
For present purposes, Blaisdell is significant for the Court's test to 
determine the "legitimacy" of the state end put forth to support a 
challenged statute. Whereas the Stone Court discussed the police 
power as an apparently unqualified power, 75 the "legitimate ends" 
analysis under Blaisdell required: (1) the existence of an emergency; 
(2) that the "relief afforded ... be of a character appropriate to that 
emergency"; (3) that the impairment be reasonable; and (4) that the 
legislation be effective only during the exigency.76 The "appropriate 
66. Again, the "implied term" methodology represents an approach whereby the Court read 
into every contract an implied term: the contracting parties realized and voluntarily subjected 
themselves to the possibility that the legislature might modify their contract by statute. For a 
discussion of the Blaisdell test, see infra notes 67-77 and accompanying text. 
67. 290 U.S. 398 (1934). 
68. Specifically, the law allowed for postponement of foreclosure and sale of properties for 
which the holder was in default, and for extension of the holder's redemption period. These 
provisions were effective during the period the legislature had determined an emergency to exist. 
290 U.S. at 415-18. 
69. 290 U.S. at 439-42. 
70. American Land Co. v. Zeiss, 219 U.S. 47 (1911) (upholding California emergency title 
registry legislation enacted in the wake of a catastrophic San Francisco earthquake). 
71. Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921) (holding a District of Columbia rent control statute 
valid in light of a housing shortage due to World War I). 
72. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 443-44. 
73. 290 U.S. at 443-44. 
74. 290 U.S. at 445 (emphasis added). 
75. See supra notes 56-64 (discussing Stone v. Mississippi and the police powers doctrine). 
76. 290 U.S. at 444-47. 
November 1993] Note - The Contract Clause 409 
character" and "reasonable impairment" requirements permit a court 
to make discretionary judgments based on factors that are inherently 
relative.77 Moreover, these factors render legitimate a state act regard-
less of whether a private party should have factored the possibility of 
such action into its decision to contract. Although the Court could 
have retained the implied term methodology by creating an "emer-
gency condition" exception similar to the police powers exception, the 
Court instead opted for a more sweeping and open-ended standard. 
The Blaisdell opinion thus departs from the focus on reliance embod-
ied in the constitutional history and the Court's prior jurisprudence. 
Later applications of the legitimate ends test broadened the excep-
tion as defined in Blaisdell and thus narrowed the purview of the Con-
tract Clause. The Court thereby afforded legislatures even greater 
leeway in crafting laws that impaired contracts. For instance, the 
Court held that emergency conditions need not exist in order for the 
state to impair contracts in the name of mere "legitimate ends."78 
Further, the Court later noted that, with respect to necessity and rea-
sonableness determinations, courts usually will defer to legislative 
judgments. 79 In doing so, the Court effectively abandoned Blaisdell's 
demand that an impairment be "reasonable." 
The Court's holding in Blaisdell set the stage for later decisions in 
which the Court engaged in wholesale balancing without regard to 
party reliance or unfair surprise. Blaisdell and its progeny essentially 
ignored the Contract Clause's original goal and thereby created an at-
mosphere in which market actors are uncertain as to how a court 
might treat their contracts. Rather, this line of cases leaves con-
tracting parties to the whim of a balancing court's weighing of the 
factors that the particular court deems relevant. 80 
Drawing upon Blaisdell and subsequent cases defining and broad-
ening the legitimate ends doctrine, the Court has formulated the test it 
currently applies. This test requires judges to engage in a multiple-
factor balancing, in which they consider whether the state legislation 
is "reasonable and necessary to serve an important public purpose, "81 
as well as whether the impairment to the contract is "severe."82 The 
modem Contract Clause jurisprudence vividly demonstrates the 
Court's abandonment of its original single-principled approach and its 
adoption of a less consistent, less certain standard. The Court now 
77. See Rappaport, supra note 14, at 919 n.7 (examining the language of the Court's current 
test). 
78. Veix v. Sixth Ward Bldg. & Loan, 310 U.S. 32, 39-40 (1940) (permitting states retroac-
tively to apply modified building and loan laws even in the absence of an emergency). 
79. United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. l, 22-23 (1977). 
80. See Rappaport, supra note 14, at 919 n.7 (discussing problems associated with the judi-
cial discretion entailed in the current balancing test). 
81. United States Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 25 (emphasis added). 
82. E.g., Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 246 (1978). 
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looks primarily to the relative strength of the interests served and im-
paired by the legislation. 
The Court's analysis in United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey 83 
illustrates a continued adherence to Blaisdel/'s basic blueprint. This 
adherence is particularly striking in light of the fact that United States 
Trust was the first of two cases that comprised the late-1970s revival of 
the Contract Clause. In United States Trust, New Jersey had repealed 
a 1962 statute under which both New York and New Jersey agreed to 
limit the number of "mass transit deficit operations" the Port Author-
ity could undertake. 84 Those challenging the action argued that the 
repeal sharply devalued the bonds in secondary markets and, more 
importantly, modified a statutory contract between the state and the 
bondholders.85 Although the Court struck down the New Jersey 
act, 86 it demonstrated a willingness to uphold legislation not only 
when the state acts under a recognized power, but also when the 
"challenged state legislation [is] sufficiently important to warrant the 
legislation's frustration of contract-based expectations."87 Even while 
recognizing the Contract Clause's purpose of protecting such expecta-
tions, United States Trust allows a court to abrogate that purpose 
through its balancing test. 
A subsequent case made more clear the distance between the 
Court's original approach and its current test. In Allied Structural 
Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 88 the second decision in the Contract Clause's 
renaissance, the Court struck down a Minnesota pension benefits law 
on Contract Clause grounds. 89 The majority in Allied Steel looked to 
83. 431 U.S. 1 (1977). 
84. 431 U.S. at 9-10. "Mass transit deficit operations" under the statute included, with enu-
merated exceptions, any rail transportation system or project. 431 U.S. at 10. 
85. 431 U.S. at 17, 19. 
86. The Court rested its ruling on the notion that the State had not employed a less drastic 
means to achieve its goals. United States Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 29-31. Figuring prominently in 
the Court's holding was the fact that New Jersey sought to modify its own contractual obligation 
through the repeal. See 431 U.S. at 26, 31. There is some doubt, however, as to the validity of 
the Court's distinction between public and private contracts. See, e.g., Kmiec & McGinnis, supra 
note 6, at 546 n.101, 547 (criticizing the distinction on the grounds that it enjoys no support from 
constitutional history or prior jurisprudence). For a possible justification of the Court's rationale 
in so holding, see infra note 174 and accompanying text (discussing government contracts). 
87. Note, supra note 14, at 1415-16 & n.10; see also 431 U.S. at 18-21, 28-32 (discussing the 
relative importance of private and state interests). 
88. 438 U.S. 234 (1978). 
89. The statute required certain employers ceasing business operations in the state to 
purchase deferred annuities to cover the pensions of all employees who had worked for the em· 
player for 10 or more years. Allied Steel, 438 U.S. at 238. The statute subjected the employer to 
this "pension funding charge" if the existing pension funds were insufficient to provide for all 
employees described above. This law was inconsistent with the petitioner's pension agreement 
with its labor force. The agreement created a tripartite priority system whereby the employer 
would use the funds first to pay those already retired, then those eligible for retirement, and, 
finally, those who did not yet have pension rights. The petitioner's contractual obligations, un· 
like those the law imposed, extended only as far as the amount in the pension fund. 438 U.S. at 
237-38. 
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three factors in its balancing test: substantial impairment, existence of 
an "important general social problem," and existence of an emer-
gency.90 Although "the high value the Framers placed on the protec-
tion of private contracts"91 proved influential in the Court's holding, 
that factor alone did not provide a sufficient standard to determine the 
validity of the act at issue. Rather, the Court returned to the balanc-
ing analysis in which it had engaged since Blaisdell. The Court first 
found the state had "substantially impaired" the petitioner's contract 
by modifying what the Court dubbed a "basic term" of that contract.92 
Further, the Court found no apparent "important general social prob-
lem" that the statute might purport to remedy.93 Because the law ap-
plied only to private employers with one hundred or more workers 
terminating operations in the state, it would only affect a very narrow 
class. The Court thus distinguished the statute from the one at issue 
in Blaisdell. 94 Of particular import for the Court were the facts that 
the challenged legislation was not temporary in nature, and no eco-
nomic emergency justified its enactment.95 Consequently, no overrid-
ing state interest saved the statute from constitutional attack under the 
Contract Clause. 
Even after this brief resurrection of the clause came to an end, the 
Court continued to cling to its practice of balancing interests in Con-
tract Clause challenges. A recent manifestation of this phenomenon is 
Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis. 96 Keystone Coal in-
volved an unsuccessful challenge to a Pennsylvania statute by an asso-
ciation of coal mining operators. 97 The operators asserted that the 
statute impaired agreements under which claims arising from damages 
to surface property were waived. Therefore, according to the petition-
ers, the law violated the Contract Clause. The Court, however, ruled 
that the statute did not create an impermissible contractual modifica-
90. 438 U.S. at 244-50. In light of the Court's abandonment of the "emergency" require-
ment in Veix v. Sixth Ward Bldg. & Loan Assn., 310 U.S. 32 (1940), it is unclear why the Court 
invoked it here. The obvious tone of Allied Steel reflects the majority's wish to resurrect the 
clause as a basis for vigorous constitutional review. Perhaps the Court felt that in order to do so 
it would have to narrow the circumstances in which a state could win in a balancing. See Note, 
supra note 14, at 1417 & n.18 (discussing the Court's method in Allied Steel as "strict scrutiny"). 
91. Allied Steel, 438 U.S. at 245. 
92. 438 U.S. at 244-46. The language of reasonable expectation and reliance is particularly 
prevalent in this portion of the opinion. The Court specifically stated that in light of the em-
ployer's compliance with applicable tax laws, and the absence of any other legislative require-
ments regarding pensions, "[t]he company ... had no reason to anticipate that its employees' 
pension rights could become vested except in accordance with the terms of the plan." 438 U.S. at 
245-46. 
93. 438 U.S. at 247-49. 
94. 438 U.S. at 248-49. 
95. 438 U.S. at 249. 
96. 480 U.S. 470 (1987). 
97. The act in question required operators to leave in place coal supporting the land on 
which "protected" surface structures rested. 480 U.S. at 502. 
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tion. 98 Once again, the Court relied on a fluid balancing test in reach-
ing its decision. Although it found that the state of Pennsylvania had 
substantially impaired the contractual rights of the petitioners,99 the 
Court held that, in light of the significant public purpose that the stat-
ute served100 and the high degree of deference accorded to the legisla-
ture's choice of means to effect a legitimate end, 101 the law satisfied the 
modem Contract Clause standard. 
Keystone Coal and the other recent decisions have solidified the 
Court's balancing approach, yet problems with this approach are man-
ifest. The Contract Clause decisions since Blaisdell suffer from com-
mon weaknesses: overly broad judicial discretion, a dearth of 
standards for private actors, and an undue tolerance of undisciplined 
legislatures. First, the Court's current balancing approach permits in-
consistent determinations in largely similar contexts. A juxtaposition 
of the Court's holdings in Blaisdell and Allied Steel serves to illustrate 
this phenomenon. While the Court in Blaisdell found that the eco-
nomic crisis present at that time gave rise to an "emergency" within 
the meaning of the Blaisdell test, the Allied Steel Court found no such 
emergency. Indeed, although no serious general economic malaise ex-
isted at the time of Allied Steel, there apparently was a crisis in pen-
sion plans sufficient to give rise to a national initiative, ERISA. 102 The 
Court's finding of an emergency in Blaisdell and not in Allied Steel 
thus raises doubts as to the validity of the Court's methodology; one 
could dispute whether the state's interest in protecting pensioners' 
benefits is any less compelling than its interest in protecting the homes 
of its citizenry .103 The sort of arbitrary distinction between these two 
values, which a balancing test permits, further deprives the Court's 
current standard of any pretense of consistency and fairness. Even if 
this distinction rests on the notion that the law in Allied Steel affects 
fewer people than that in Blaisdell, the balancing test relegates the 
Contract Clause to a mere matter of line drawing without regard to 
the clause's purpose of protecting contracting parties from unfair sur-
98. 480 U.S. at 478-79. 
99. Because the act "remove[d] the surface owners' contractual obligations to waive dam-
ages," the Court agreed "that the statute operate[d] as 'a substantial impairment of a contractual 
relationship.' " 480 U.S. at 504 (quoting Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 
244 (1978) (footnote omitted)). 
100. 480 U.S. at 485-86. 
101. This aspect of the Keystone Coal opinion is somewhat confusing. While acknowledging 
the need that the modification of obligations be of a character appropriate to the state's goals, 480 
U.S. at 505-06, the Court stated that, outside of a government contract scenario, it would not 
"second guess [a state's] determinations [as to] the most appropriate ways of dealing with [a] 
problem.'' 480 U.S. at 506. The Court thus seems to indicate that it will at once scrutinize and 
defer to legislative decisionmaking. See Kmiec & McGinnis, supra note 6, at 552. 
102. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1001-1461 (1988)). 
103. See, e.g., Kmiec & McGinnis, supra note 6, at 549. 
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prise. As the comparison between the holdings in Allied Steel and 
Blaisdell demonstrates, the sort of interest one Justice or iteration of 
the Court might view as "substantial," "compelling," or "important" 
in one context may not be so strong in another set of circumstances. 
Further, the relative weights judges assign to the same factor may vary 
drastically.104 
Secondly, if the Court is indeed concerned with contract as a basis 
for "order[ing] ... personal and business affairs,"105 a balancing test 
certainly does not further that concern. By creating unnecessary un-
certainty through judicial discretion and by failing to provide objective 
factors against which to judge the reasonableness of one's reliance, the 
Court has created a setting in which individuals must make a blind 
gamble when entering certain sorts of contracts. A market actor can 
only hope that, when a state enacts a retroactive statute, the balancing 
judge's subjective views harmonize with the private party's prediction. 
Finally, the Court's balancing analysis allows states to pass overly 
sweeping legislation without regard to potential adverse retroactive ef-
fects. The legislature, absent some constant view of the meaning of the 
Contract Clause's prohibition, will not be deterred from passing laws 
without first determining whether those laws survive Contract Clause 
scrutiny. Rather, the legislature will more likely be inclined to chance 
a favorable balance in the courts. 
II. THE HEAVILY REGULATED INDUSTRY DOCTRINE AND 
UNCERTAINTY 
The Court's recent treatment of Contract Clause challenges de-
parts from the balancing approach described above in the context of 
heavily regulated industries. A heavily regulated industry is one for 
which the state has created an extensive body of regulatory law.106 
Historical and pervasive regulation of certain fields has given rise to 
the heavily regulated industry doctrine, whereby a court imputes to 
the legislature an intent to control all aspects of an enterprise.107 The 
doctrine thus creates a broad rule that changes in a regulatory scheme 
will presumptively defeat a claim of reliance in a Contract Clause 
challenge. 
The HRID represents a partial return by the Court to an expecta-
tions-based approach in modem Contract Clause challenges. The ba-
sic reasoning of the doctrine is couched in reliance and unfair surprise 
104. Compare United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 31 (1977) (majority charac-
terizing the impairment as "drastic") with United States Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 41 (Brennan, J., 
dissenting) (describing impairment as causing "the most minimal damage"). 
105. Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 245 (1978). 
106. See Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176, 194 & n.14 (1983). 
107. See 462 U.S. at 194 & n.14. 
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terms. 108 That is, by forcing private parties to recognize that the state 
exercises relative hegemony over a field, the doctrine presumes that 
those parties cannot reasonably expect legislative change not to affect 
private transactions in that area. Underlying this rationale are certain 
implicit assumptions concerning the nature of legal rules and the pre-
rogatives of the bodies promulgating those rules. The doctrine rests in 
part on the inherent fluidity of laws and regulations in areas of heavy 
regulation. 109 Because the rules are mutable, the more pervasive an 
area's legal scheme, the less certainty an actor in that area will have. 
One cannot avoid this mutability by making a contract in the area, 
thereby creating some measure of stability. 110 The doctrine imposes 
the burden of this uncertainty on the private actor. In other words, 
the doctrine assumes that the actor has tailored her risk calculus with 
uncertainty in mind, and that she realizes that any expectations of 
continuity in the area are not reasonable. The doctrine thus mimics 
the implied term logic of the eminent domain and police powers 
decisions. 111 
Section II.A reviews the recent decisions invoking the heavily reg-
ulated industry doctrine and shows how those decisions reflect a reli-
ance-based approach to the Contract Clause. Further, the section 
discusses how the doctrine departs from the current balancing test, 
and how it permits the state to act for the public good while maintain-
ing a focus on party expectations. Section II.B examines the view of 
reliance implicit in the doctrine. This view assumes that, when deter-
mining whether to rely on a contract, a private party should look not 
only to the isolated transaction, but also to external factors bearing on 
the wisdom of that reliance. The section shows that when circum-
stances surrounding the transaction, such as state control over the 
contract's subject matter, suggest that legal change is likely, an expec-
tation of legal stability is unreasonable. This conception of reasonable-
ness and reliance is significant in three ways. First, it demonstrates the 
Court's renewed concern for party expectations. Secondly, the 
HRID's reasonableness analysis allows the Court to avoid ad hoc 
judgments of the Contract Clause's applicability. Finally, as will be-
108. See Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 413-16 
(1983) (discussing the history of natural gas regulation in Kansas and finding that "[p]rice regu-
lation existed and was foreseeable as the type of law that would alter contract obligations"), 
109. For full discussion, see infra section 11.C. 
110. See, e.g., Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 357 (1908) ("One whose rights, 
such as they are, are subject to State restriction, cannot remove them from the power of the state 
by making a contract about them. The contract will carry with it the infirmity of the subject 
matter.") (citations omitted). Although Justice Holmes' opinion in Hudson Water Co. does not 
exemplify the modem heavily regulated industry doctrine, its reasoning mirrors that of the mod-
em doctrine. 
111. See, e.g., Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814 (1879); West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 
U.S. 507 (1848). For full discussion of these cases and the implied term doctrine, see supra 
section I.A. 
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come apparent in Part III, the reasonableness and reliance thesis pro-
vides the groundwork for this Note's field occupation model. Section 
Il.C identifies certain of these variables and discusses what in the na-
ture of legislatures lends an element of uncertainty to state action. 
Section Il.C.1 analyzes the conception of the legislature upon which 
the HRID rests. This analysis will entail a discussion of time and un-
certainty as well as structural factors creating uncertainty in the state 
of the law controlling a contract. The section demonstrates how, in 
light of this uncertainty, a party cannot reasonably believe that the 
laws affecting a transaction or contract will remain static. Finally, sec-
tion Il.C.2 examines "inalienability" doctrine, which reasons that cer-
tain powers inhere in legislatures, and explains how the heavily 
regulated industry doctrine's tolerance of legislative change reflects in-
alienability concerns. The legislature's inalienable powers further con-
tribute to the uncertainty imposed on contracting parties through state 
regulation. Given the HRID's view of reasonable expectations and the 
uncertainty associated with legislatures and legislative action, Part II 
concludes that, under the HRID, a court would hold expectations un-
reasonable where the expectations fail to appreciate the possibility of 
legislative change in regulated areas or in areas subject to the inaliena-
ble powers. 
A. The Heavily Regulated Industry Doctrine Opinions 
An early enunciation of the heavily regulated industry doctrine's 
methodology appeared in the decision of Veix v. Sixth Ward Building 
& Loan Assn. 112 In Veix, the Supreme Court upheld the application of 
amended building and loan laws to building and loan shares bought 
before the amendments. The challenged portion of the statute modi-
fied prior law defining shareholder withdrawal rights. 113 The Court 
observed at the outset of its analysis the pervasive nature of building 
and loan regulation. 114 It is notable that the Court invoked the Tenth 
Amendment police power to find that the regulatory scheme as a 
whole constituted a legitimate exercise of legislative authority. 115 As 
such, any change in that body of law would also fall within the realm 
of state power. The Court thus asserted that, when a private party 
purchases "into an enterprise already regulated in the particular to 
which [the party] objects, he purchase[s] subject to further legislation 
112. 310 U.S. 32 (1940). 
113. 310 U.S. at 35. 
114. 310 U.S. at 37 ("It is also plain that the [challenged] act was one of a long series regulat-
ing the many integrated phases of the building and loan business such as formation, membership, 
powers, investments, reports, liquidations, foreign associations and examinations."). 
115. "With institutions of such importance to its economy, the 'State retains police powers 
adequate to authorize the enactment of statutes regulating the withdrawal of shares .... [T]he 
obligation of the Association to respond to the application for withdrawal was subject to the 
paramount police power." 310 U.S. at 38 (footnote omitted). 
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upon the same topic."116 
Veix functions as a natural extension of the Stone Court's implied 
term jurisprudence.117 In Stone, the Court held that a party must at 
all times temper its expectations with knowledge of the state's power 
to provide for the public health, safety, and morals. 118 Similarly, when 
a party initially contracts subject to a statute furthering a legitimate 
state interest, that party recognizes the state interest and should not be 
surprised by subsequent laws in the same area. The Court essentially 
created an implied contractual term providing for such legal change. 
More recently, the Court has upheld modifications in the law even 
when the prior law did not directly regulate the contract at issue. In 
Energy Reserves Group v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 119 Energy 
Reserves Group unsuccessfully challenged a Kansas statute control-
ling natural gas prices following federal deregulation. The Court 
maintained a balancing test, yet factored into its consideration 
"whether the industry the complaining party has entered has been reg-
ulated in the past."120 The Court found that the natural gas industry 
was a heavily regulated field despite Kansas's failure specifically to 
regulate natural gas prices at the time of contracting. Because of the 
"extensive and intrusive" nature of the state's supervision of several 
aspects of the enterprise, 121 the new law defeated no reasonable 
expectations.122 
Similarly, the Court in Exxon v. Eagerton 123 addressed a Contract 
Clause challenge to changes in state oil and gas laws. The Court 
found that a prohibition on the power of producers and distributors to 
pass along to purchasers the costs of a severance tax in fact restricted 
contractual obligations.124 Nevertheless, the Court held that, because 
116. 310 U.S. at 38 (footnote omitted). The Court justified this pronouncement by analogy 
to reserved power statutes whereby states are able to modify corporate charters. 310 U.S. at 40. 
The apparent connection between these two phenomena is that in both contexts, the state seeks 
to assert - either explicitly or implicitly - essentially plenary control over a matter. 
117. See supra notes 56-64 and accompanying text. 
118. Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 821 (1879). 
119. 459 U.S. 400 (1983). 
120. 459 U.S. at 411. The elements of the test include inquiry into (1) the degree of impair-
ment of the contract; (2) the public purpose behind the legislation; and (3) the reasonableness of 
the regulation in light of the purpose. 459 U.S. at 411-13. The Court thus did not abandon its 
balancing test but rather supplemented it with the heavily regulated industry doctrine. 459 U.S. 
at 411. Because of this adherence to the balancing test, it is unclear exactly how prominently the 
doctrine figured in arriving at the Court's holding. 
121. 459 U.S. at 413-14 & n.18. 
122. 459 U.S. at 413-16. The Court noted that "[s]tate authority to regulate natural gas 
prices is well established." 459 U.S. at 413 (citing Cities Serv. Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 
340 U.S. 179 (1950)). Energy Reserves Group thus seems to follow the formula of Veix, that is, 
asserting the legitimacy of the underlying scheme, then finding heavy regulation defeating 
reliance. 
123. 462 U.S. 176 (1983). 
124. The party challenging the statute retained the right to pass on the cost of the severance 
tax by contract. See 462 U.S. at 189 n.10. 
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regulation of the oil and gas industry fell well within the realm of the 
legislative power, regulation of the burden of taxation also was within 
that realm. 125 The Court thus apparently engaged in a two-step pro-
cess, whereby it examined whether the initial exercise of power in that 
field was valid, then gave deference to state action in that field. Re-
gardless of whether the state had spoken with respect to the specific 
matter on which the party seeks to contract, the Court would not in-
validate a legal rule contravening agreed-to terms if the law fell within 
a field already subject to legitimate state regulation. The Court thus 
imputed validity from a general class of acts to a specific act. 
Questions still exist as to exactly how much legislative activity in 
an area gives rise to heavy regulation. For instance, as Energy 
Reserves Group and Exxon suggest, laws touching upon the subject 
matter of the statute in a state or even another jurisdiction might cre-
ate heavy regulation. Whether this also means that tangential regula-
tion might render an entire industry heavily regulated is not clear. 
The closest the Supreme Court has come to enunciating a standard is 
in a Fourth Amendment context.126 In Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., the 
Labor Department argued that the presence of occupational safety and 
health regulations rendered Barlow's a " 'pervasively regulated busi-
ness'" and therefore not protected by the Warrant Clause for OSHA 
purposes.127 The Court rejected this assertion, however, reasoning 
that the pervasive regulation exception to Fourth Amendment rights 
applies only to industries with "such a history of government over-
sight that no reasonable expectation of privacy ... could exist."128 
Although Barlow's arose in a context wholly unrelated to the Contract 
Clause, the Court's discussion of pervasive regulation in that case 
might prove instructive in determining what constitutes a heavily reg-
ulated industry. 
The HRID represents a return to a focus on reasonable expecta-
tions in Contract Clause challenges. Although it permits a statute to 
defeat actual party expectations, it does so only when the party was 
unreasonable in its reliance. The doctrine achieves this effect by defin-
ing as inherently unreasonable an expectation of legal stability in a 
heavily regulated field. The doctrine thus gives parties a constant 
standard against which to judge the wisdom of transacting in reliance 
on the state of the law. 
B. Reliance and Reasonableness 
The heavily regulated industry doctrine is important not only be-
cause of its return to a focus on reliance, but also because of the view 
125. 462 U.S. at 194 & n.14. 
126. See Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978). 
127. 436 U.S at 313 (quoting United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972)). 
128. 436 U.S. at 313 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)). 
418 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 92:398 
of reliance the doctrine manifests. The heavily regulated industry doc-
trine imposes on contracting parties' reliance claims a requirement of 
reasonableness. That is, the doctrine deems that market actors should 
acknowledge substantial government control of their enterprise and 
tailor their expectations in light of that control. 
Although much of the HRID's view of reliance is unspoken, the 
concept of reasonableness of expectations enjoys extensive discussion 
in legal scholarship. Professor Stephen Munzer explains that a "rea-
sonable expectation" requires both "rationality" and "legitimacy."129 
The rationality of an expectation depends on the ability of the con-
tracting party adequately to judge the probability of an occurrence. 
"[A]n expectation is rational if the probability assigned to the pre-
dicted event corresponds suitably to the actual likelihood that it will 
occur, and if the person making the prediction has good grounds for 
assigning the probability he does."130 
One commentator has suggested that courts should view party reli-
ance purely along rationality lines. From this standpoint, a court 
would treat legal change as any other frustrating market change. Pro-
fessor Louis Kaplow submits that "[p]erceptive investors will typically 
act on probability estimates of possible changes in the legal regime, 
just as they will take into account the probabilities of changes in rele-
vant market conditions - such as anticipated future demand, behav-
ior of competitors, weather patterns, and the ultimate feasibility of 
untested inventions."131 Kaplow proposes that, in light of the similar-
ity between market and legal risks, investors should bear the burdens 
9f legal transitions in the same way they do the burdens of market 
transitions. 132 A private party must absorb whatever losses arise from 
a prediction that proves, in retrospect, to be irrational. Kaplow would 
therefore do away with transition policies such as the Contract Clause, 
129. Stephen R. Munzer, A Theory of Retroactive Legislation, 61 TEXAS L. REV. 425, 429 
(1982). 
130. Id. at 430. The reader should note that this model does not require absolute certainty in 
its prediction. Rather, it demands only that the party have a reasoned basis for her position -
one which considers the possibility of changes in the environment surrounding the transaction, 
including both legal and market transitions. Expectations are neither entirely rational nor en· 
tirely irrational. Greater or lesser fluctuation in a state of affairs lends lesser or greater rational· 
ity to a contracting party's reliance on the stability of the status quo. A contracting party can 
never tell with moral certainty that the law will remain static. See id. at 456-57 (differentiating 
between "could not" and "would not" concerning the possibility of government change). If 
correctness in prediction were the standard for rationality, however, the occurrence of a legal 
change would defeat any expectation that no change would occur. See Louis Kaplow, An Eco-
nomic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 511, 525 n.38 (1986). The Contract 
Clause would then become a dead letter. The question thus becomes what factors a market actor 
should consider in deciding whether to rely on a state of affairs, regardless of whether that condi· 
tion in fact changes. 
131. Kaplow, supra note 130, at 525-26. 
132. Id. at 533-36. 
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whereby the government must relieve the risks it imposes on private 
actors. 
Although the heavily regulated industry doctrine does not adopt 
Kaplow's suggestion regarding the abolition of transitional relief, it 
does assume that parties engage in a modified form of the risk assess-
ment entailed in Kaplow's model. The HRID calculus, however, 
hinges on an expectation's legitimacy, not its rationality. 
Legitimacy requires that the expectation harmonize with the spirit 
of the laws inducing the expectation, and with the "fundamental prin-
ciples embedded in the legal system itself."133 By way of illustration, 
Munzer provides the example of a market actor who conforms her 
actions to the letter of the law, yet knows that her acts run counter to 
the goals of the statute on which she relies. 134 A requirement of legiti-
macy, Munzer reasons, would "permit a frustrating change ... even if 
a surprise . . . because of the way the change is connected with the 
justificatory structure of the institution."135 Moreover, legitimacy 
bears on an expectation's rationality in that it informs the party's abil-
ity accurately to predict the future status and treatment of her acts. A 
party's estimation of probabilities cannot ignore pertinent facts regard-
ing the purpose of a given statute or the legal system while maintain-
ing a pretension of rationality. 
Under the heavily regulated industry doctrine, the reasonableness 
of a challenging party's expectation depends less on her judgment as to 
133. Munzer, supra note 129, at 432. 
134. Id. 
135. Id. at 433. The reader might consider the legitimacy requirement in a "curative" legis-
lation context. Professor Hochman delineates two categories of curative statute: (1) "statutes 
which ratify prior official conduct"; and (2) statutes "designed retroactively to cure defects in an 
administrative system." Hochman, supra note 21, at 704. 
After a review of decisions treating statutes of both types favorably, Hochman concludes that 
"[i]t is necessary that the legislature should be able to cure inadvertent defects in statutes or their 
administration by making what has been aptly called 'small repairs.' " Id. at 705 (footnotes 
omitted). More important for present purposes, Hochman observes that "the individual who 
claims that a vested right has arisen from the defect is seeking a windfall since, had the legisla-
ture's or the administrator's action had the effect it was intended to and could have had, no such 
right would have arisen.'' Id. 
Munzer's legitimacy requirement and the judicial tolerance of legislative correction are two 
sides of the same coin. As an example of a rational but illegitimate expectation, Munzer offers a 
scenario in which a man marries less than two years after obtaining a divorce from another 
woman. Under the law of his jurisdiction at the time of remarriage, a person cannot marry 
within two years after a divorce. Later, this man marries a third woman without first divorcing 
the second. In the time between the second and third marriages, however, the legislature repeals 
the two-year requirement. The man may now rationally expect that the second marriage is inva-
lid under the law at the time it was entered into, and that he is therefore neither liable for 
alimony nor a bigamist. Munzer asserts that because the expectation was not legitimate - that 
is, that it was the purpose of the law to validate marriages within two years of divorce, the 
expectation is unreasonable. Munzer, supra note 129, at 433. 
Curative legislation jurisprudence deals with the same type of scenario Munzer hypothesizes. 
The major difference between "legitimacy" and "correction" is in perspective. Whereas 
Hochman focuses on the need to allow governments to effect their stated goals, Munzer requires 
the actor to account for that need, and thus deprives the actor of reliance on a flawed law. 
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the likelihood of legal change in the field than on her acknowledge-
ment of systemic factors, such as the state's interest in the subject mat-
ter of the contract. In this regard, the HRID's standard of 
reasonableness is a standard of legitimacy. The Court's reasoning in 
Exxon and Energy Reserves Group assumes that a market actor's reli-
ance on the state of the law is unreasonable, or, more specifically, ille-
gitimate, because of the nature of heavy regulation. Granted, it is 
conceivable that legal change in the heavily regulated field might be 
slow or even nonexistent, thus lending rationality to a prediction of 
stability. However, the party's expectation is inherently illegitimate, 
because one should not expect existing legal rules to be permanent. 
Moreover, legitimacy would appear to subsume rationality for 
Contract Clause purposes. 136 The heavily regulated industry doctrine 
suggests that, when a state manifests its interest in a field through a 
scheme of regulation, a market actor should at all times account for 
that interest, irrespective of the likelihood of actual legal change. 
Legitimacy-focused reasonableness determinations, like the HRID, 
permit broad classifications of reasonableness rather than case-by-case 
judgments. Courts may carve out areas in which expectations of legal 
continuity are inherently illegitimate. For instance, under the HRID, 
the Court has held that systemic factors create a lack of stability in 
zones of heavy regulation. In light of this uncertainty, the doctrine 
holds that anyone conducting business in a heavily regulated field sub-
jects herself to the perils and pitfalls associated with such uncertainty. 
136. See. e.g., United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977). The Court in United 
States Trust held that a modification of a state's own obligation under a bond issue violated the 
Contract Clause. Professor Munzer questions the validity of this holding on the grounds that the 
bondholders could not reasonably expect the state not to modify its obligation. Munzer, supra 
note 129, at 456-61. 
Munzer first argues that the bondholders' reliance was irrational if they believed the covenant 
"could not be repealed." Id. at 456-57. "[T]he bondholders •.• should have considered that the 
contract clause had been heavily qualified and that for forty years the Supreme Court had struck 
down no statute on its sole authority." Id. at 457. The challenging parties thus gave insufficient 
weight to the possibility of repeal in their risk assessment. 
As to the legitimacy of the bondholders' expectations, Munzer turns to the "fundamental 
principles embedded in the legal system" to argue that the expectation was illegitimate. The 
concept that a past legislature cannot limit by contract a future legislature's power to act in the 
public interest, and the fact that economic legislation is not subject to close scrutiny, both mili-
tate against the legitimacy of the parties' reliance. Id. at 457-58. 
It would appear that in this respect, Munzer's two requirements overlap. For instance, how 
can a party "rationally" expect that a flawed law will not change? Would not the intent of the 
law and the legal system's basic principles figure in the ability to predict an event? Further, 
Munzer either engages in a little bootstrapping here, or he would have a party include in her 
calculus the courts' likely treatment of a challenge, as well as the probability of state action. The 
notion that the contracting party in United States Trust should have considered the fact that the 
Court over the course of 40 years had rendered the Contract Clause a virtual nullity is pro-
foundly circular. Munzer seems to say that the Contract Clause is dead because the Contract 
Clause is dead. If, however, he suggests that individuals consider their chances of vindicating 
their rights in court, then market actors would have to account for matters far remote from their 
transactions. This would inject another variable into a party's risk calculus - the arbiter as 
affecting expectations. · 
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This practice of effecting broadly applicable standards achieves two 
significant benefits. First, by avoiding individualized conclusions of 
rationality or irrationality, the practice serves judicial economy. Sec-
ondly, by explicitly defining zones of uncertainty, courts can provide 
market actors with hard and fast rules on which to base their decisions 
whether or not to contract. 
C. Legislatures and Legislation 
Although the HRID presupposes the need to account for subse-
quent state legislation in an actor's reasonableness calculus, the Court 
has not explained why this requirement is important. The Court 
merely assumes that the state might decide to change the legal scheme. 
This section seeks to define the view of legislatures inherent in the 
heavily regulated industry doctrine's assumption that legislative action 
is an uncertain variable in a party's risk analysis. The section ad-
dresses institutional factors which create instability in the legal back-
drop against which contracts are made and explains how these 
fundamental principles underlying the legal scheme affect and inform 
party reliance. Central to a party's reasonableness calculus is an un-
derstanding of discontinuities in legal institutions and the legislative 
product. Such an understanding clarifies the factors causing a party's 
belief in the stability of the legal scheme ultimately to be unreasonable. 
This examination of the factors underlying discontinuities in the 
legislative product addresses two aspects of legislatures. Section II.C.l 
analyzes how the nature of a fluid lawmaking body - that is, a body 
reconstituted at periodic intervals - leads to changes in priorities and 
preferences, which in turn create legal discontinuities. Section II.C.2 
examines the inherent and reserved powers of state legislatures to 
show that their lack of stability ultimately affects a private actor's abil-
ity to rely reasonably on an underlying legal framework in entering 
into a contract. 
1. Time and Uncertainty 
One of the principal factors contributing to changes in legislative 
preferences is remoteness in time. This factor is crucial to an under-
standing of why legal changes arise as well as why the HRID tolerates 
such changes. Much as individuals may be poor predictors of their 
future preferences, lawmakers are plagued by uncertainty as to what 
future conditions will require. In many contexts, legislative and other-
wise, an inverse relationship exists between distance in time and the 
ability to foresee the wants and needs of one's future self. This phe-
nomenon manifests itself in the tendency to discount future pains and 
pleasures, and to accord inordinate weight to present pains and 
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pleasures. 137 A juxtaposition of this predisposition in individual and 
legislative contexts bears out this assertion. When a party contracts to 
perform a service five years hence, that party makes two predictions. 
First, she predicts that external conditions - for example, the econ-
omy and the environment - will allow performance for which she 
will receive fair consideration. Second, she predicts that her prefer-
ences will remain substantially the same.138 For the sake of effi-
ciency, 139 the law assumes that the individual's second prediction is 
correct, although this assumption is not necessarily accurate. 140 Ex-
cept under certain circumstances, 141 the law assumes the first predic-
tion to be accurate. 
In the context of a fluid legislature, these assumptions become less 
safe. Not only does the lawmaking body face the uncertainty inherent 
in making decisions that will not come to fruition until some time in 
the future, it also must predict the preferences both of its future self 
and of its constituency. A fluid legislature, by definition, will not be 
the same body from timeA to timeB, nor will the population the body 
represents remain constant from A to B. A lawmaker may be able to 
gauge with a high degree of certainty her principals' wishes. However, 
when she seeks to speak for a more hypothetical population, that as-
surance fades. 142 Shifts in the makeup of the constituency, as well as 
shifts in its condition, force the legislature to reevaluate its defined 
policies and goals. Should the institution fail to engage in such a prac-
tice, certain sectors of the population would not enjoy representation 
in all matters, nor would they enjoy equal status with those sectors 
whose preferences are reflected in a prior legislative pronounce-
ment.143 Therefore, by according full representation through the pro-
137. This tendency is what is known as a "bias toward the near." See DEREK PARFIT, REA· 
SONS AND PERSONS 159 (1984). 
138. See Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763, 
780 (1983) (designating the first type of prediction, if erroneous, as giving rise to "disappoint-
ment," and the second type as giving rise to "regret"). 
139. Some scholars have argued that respect for contract does not merely serve efficiency 
concerns, but that such a model also acknowledges and protects personal autonomy. See, e.g., 
Stewart E. Sterk, The Continuity of Legislatures: Of Contracts and the Contracts Clause, 88 
COLUM. L. REV. 647, 653 (1988). 
140. See id. at 657. 
141. See, e.g., id. at 655-57 (discussion of bankruptcy, impossibility, and commercial imprac-
ticability exceptions to the American rule of respect for contract). 
142. Id. at 660 ("[E]specially if one assumes constituents and their representatives to be indi-
vidualistically oriented, one might expect that a current legislature, representing current individ-
uals, will not adequately account for the interests of future individuals not yet born, not yet of the 
age of majority, or not yet citizens of the state."). 
143. Further, the failure to reevaluate the preferences of even a static constituency would not 
allow for individual discontinuity within that group. To "lock in" the wishes of the population 
as of a certain point in time is to deprive that population of the opportunity to avoid Kronman 's 
"regret." See supra note 138. 
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cess of reevaluation, the lawmaking body adds greatly to the 
possibility of inconsistent legislative product. 
Legislatures themselves are subject to frequent change. Indeed, 
one manifestation of shifts in the constituency and its preferences is 
the periodic reconstitution of the legislature. The membership of the 
institution might therefore differ greatly from one period to the next. 
Prospective decisions of a present legislature involve a prediction of 
what its future self as an institution would decide. Because of the dif-
ferences in content over time, however, the institution cannot be con-
sidered continuous with itself in the same way an individual might. 144 
A different legislature brings changes in institutional perception not 
merely from personal discontinuities among the representatives, but 
also from a different membership. 
The HRID relies, in part, on the fact of legislative discontinuity. 
The doctrine's tolerance of legal change implicitly recognizes that 
lawmakers often change their minds in light of new circumstances and 
preferences. By removing heavily regulated industries from the Con-
tract Clause's reach, the HRID ensures that no constitutional barrier 
prevents legislatures from acting on the basis of such changes.145 
2. The Powers of the Legislature 
In addition to the timing considerations section II.C.1 addresses, 
the HRID finds its theoretical bases in the legislature's necessary pow-
ers as well as in analogous constitutional doctrine. "Inalienability" 
doctrine, a theory developed first in theory and scholarship, 146 then in 
the courts, 147 stands for the proposition that a lawmaking body may 
not contract away, either explicitly in contract or implicitly by legisla-
tive act, a power inherent in that body or granted by the Constitution. 
The "inherent" and "reserved" powers of state legislatures, two areas 
of inalienability, comprise part of the fundamental principles of the 
legal system which bear on an expectation's reasonableness. The 
HRID presupposes the existence of these powers in its insistence that 
the state be able to reverse itself and to promulgate new policy. The 
doctrine thus renders illegitimate any expectation that the state would 
not exercise its powers. 
Inalienability doctrine helps to explain why we should tolerate dis-
continuities in the legislative product and why a party must account 
144. The fact that a representative may have to campaign for reelection at frequent intervals 
skews the legislator's perception. If the lawmaker's individual concern is for reelection, she will 
be more likely to seek to satisfy the short-term goals of her constituency and ignore long-term 
concerns. The convention of election thus contributes to the representative's, and thereby the 
institution's, bias toward the near. See Sterk, supra note 139, at 661. 
145. For further discussion of the propriety of allowing a present legislature to define the 
interests of and to bind a future legislature, see i'nfra section 11.C.2.a. 
146. See infra section 11.C.2.a. 
147. See infra section 11.C.2.b. 
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for such legal change in its reasonableness calculus. The inherent 
powers accrue to the legislature simply by virtue of the legislature's 
status as a popularly elected organ. These powers account for many of 
the concerns voiced in section II.C.2 by forbidding one legislature 
from binding its future self. Similarly, the reserved powers under the 
Tenth Amendment permit legislative discontinuities out of concern for 
popular sovereignty.148 Such "essential attribute[s] of sovereignty"149 
allow the state to act in the name of the public good when circum-
stances so require. To permit a party to deprive the legislature of its 
ability to exercise its prerogatives under these powers would thwart 
that institution in its efforts to effect important public goals. 
a. Inherent powers. The legislature's inherent powers flow di-
rectly from the body's discontinuous nature. As Professor Paul Kahn 
notes, "[n]ot only do its interests change, as reflected in new majorities 
displacing earlier ones, but the constituents themselves change."150 
These changes necessitate a general prerogative "to respond to chang-
ing circumstances [and] to reorder priorities in light of these 
changes."151 Inherent powers doctrine derives from a belief in the 
need that popular sovereign authority exist always in the present. 
"For the Legislator is he, not by whose authority the Lawes were first 
made, but by whose authority they now continue to be Lawes."152 
Scholars have therefore been skeptical of a framework of rules binding 
the sovereign in perpetuity. "It is thus, in the name of legislative 
supremacy, that the English invoke the Blackstonian axiom: 'Acts of 
Parliament derogatory from the power of subsequent parliaments bind 
not.' "153 
The institution's power to abandon, amend, or otherwise modify 
existing legal rules reveals itself in the concomitant inability to control 
later iterations of the same body. 154 This limit on legislative power 
148. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 15, at 405 (describing Tenth Amendment powers 
as "the residual prerogatives of sovereignty which the states had not surrendered to the federal 
government") (footnote omitted). 
149. Paul W. Kahn, Gramm-Rudman and the Capacity of Congress To Control the Future, 
13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 185, 221 (1986) (citing United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 
U.S. l, 23 (1977) (stating the rule that prior legislative acts cannot work as a bar to the exercise 
of reserved powers)). 
150. Kahn, supra note 149, at 199. 
151. Id. 
152. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 315 (Crawford B. Macpherson ed., Penguin Books 
1984) (London 1651). 
153. Julian N. Eule, Temporal Limits on the Legislative Mandate: Entrenchment and Retro-
activity, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 379, 393 (1987) (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COM-
MENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *90). 
154. Cf Kahn, supra note 149, at 222-23 & n.135 (citing cases consistent with the "concept 
[that] legislative authority •.. is linked essentially to that of popular sovereignty. A legislative 
measure that purports to bind future legislatures is, accordingly, an illogical or inappropriate 
attempt by the agent of the sovereign to bind the principal."). 
The reader might note at this point that it is somewhat perverse that the legislative process 
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appears in "last-in-time" rules of statutory construction: when two 
pieces of legislation are in direct conflict, a court will usually apply the 
more recent rule, because that rule will be the more accurate statement 
of the popular will and current circumstances. I55 
Principles of utility and equality also favor the prohibition against 
"entrenching," that is, imposing the preferences of the prior legislature 
and constituency without the option of modification or repeal. First, 
the utilitarian would see that a present legislature has better access to 
information available at a lesser cost than does a past legislature. I56 A 
prohibition against entrenchment thus allows for policies tailored to 
present conditions, and cuts down on factfinding costs for the past 
legislature. I57 Further, allowing entrenchment invites tortured inter-
pretations of law and wasted resources in attempts to circumvent the 
rule. Iss Entrenchment offends egalitarian concerns because it would 
prevent the newer constituency from enjoying equal status with its 
predecessors. By placing its interests above those of its successors, the 
past legislature deprives a future population of representation, thereby 
relegating that population to a lower position in the legal scheme. 
Sovereignty would therefore tum upon a rule of "first-in-time."I59 
Ultimately, the notion of inalienability undermines a market ac-
tor's ability to rely on a given state of the law. If a party attempts by 
assertion of reasonable reliance to maintain the status quo as of the 
time of contracting, inalienability doctrine deprives that status quo of 
any pretension of permanence. The mandate of the prior legislature 
controls only until a later iteration of that body contradicts it. Indeed, 
the inevitable concomitant of an entrenchment prohibition is a future 
requires such institutional freedom given the basis of the constitutional system. The Framers 
created a constitution which was to bind future generations. In doing so, the Constitutional 
Convention built in mechanisms which would prevent frequent modification of the document. 
Kahn does not find rules defining special amendment or repeal procedures to be problematic 
in all circumstances. For instance, Kahn cites the Administrative Procedure Act's express repeal 
provision as an example of such a rule. Id. at 201-03 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 559 (1989)). Because 
"the AP A rule does not purport to regulate the permissible content of legislative actions," Kahn 
does not find the provision offensive. Kahn, supra note 149, at 203. It is unclear whether the 
same can be said of the Constitution, and, indeed, whether the distinction between first-order 
(conduct directed) and second-order (rule directed) rules is valid. 
155. See id. at 198 n.50. Alexander Hamilton characterized the concept of "last-in-time" in 
statutory interpretation as not merely a rule for the sake of consistency, but a rule of practical 
reason. Id. at 199-200 (quoting THE FEDERALisr, supra note 33, No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), 
at 525-26). 
156. Cf. JEREMY BENTHAM, HANDBOOK OF PoLmCAL FALLACIES 55 (Harold A. Larrabee 
ed., 1952) (originally published as THE BOOK OF FALLACIES: FROM UNFINISHED PAPERS OF 
JEREMY BENTHAM, London, John & H.L. Hunt 1824). 
157. See Eule, supra note 153, at 387. 
158. Id. 
159. See Kahn, supra note 149, at 198-99. Further, allowing a legislature to deprive itself of 
any of its powers gives rise to questions of self-reference reminiscent of Douglas Hofstadter's 
stereo-destroying record. DOUGLAS R. HOFsrADTER, GODEL, EsCHER, BACH: AN ETERNAL 
GOLDEN BRAID 75-78 (1979). 
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legislature's freedom to repeal. A party's failure to acknowledge this 
fact conflicts with the basic rules underlying the legal system and is 
therefore illegitimate and undeserving of Contract Clause protection. 
b. Reserved powers doctrine. The reserved powers, such as the 
eminent domain and police powers, add to the states' ability to pro-
mulgate inconsistent legislative product. Apart from the general free-
dom to revise prior legislative acts, state legislatures may also invoke 
the powers reserved to the states under the Tenth Amendment when 
modifying the existing legal environment. 160 The reserved powers 
doctrine not only permits the institution to change its mind in matters 
on which it has previously spoken, 161 but also allows intervention into 
areas not explicitly covered by current law. Although the powers 
under this doctrine are not absolute, private parties enter into transac-
tions subject to the legitimate exercise of the state's powers irrespective 
of the government's prior position.162 These powers further limit a 
party's ability reasonably to rely on an underlying legal regime. 
For example, the eminent domain power vests in the state a perma-
nent power to defeat standing rights in property in order to serve the 
public good. In doing so, the power allows the state to claim land 
should the state's interests and preferences change with regard to 
property rights. Additionally, the power imposes upon private parties 
an element of uncertainty militating against an expectation of an abso-
lute property interest.163 The opinion in West River Bridge Co. v. 
Dix, 164 the decision in which the Court upheld a Vermont statute per-
mitting state takings of realty for public purposes, illustrates a judicial 
concern that states have the power to resolve problems arising from 
imprecise prediction. By the grant of a right in property, the govern-
ment predicts that such action is in the public interest, or at least not 
detrimental to the public good. Should it later be proven otherwise, a 
rule forbidding the state from retracting the right granted would de-
prive a present lawmaking body of a power existing in a prior one, the 
power to allow or not allow the property right to vest in a private 
actor. By imputing to the private party a recognition of the ability of 
the state later to divest the party of a property interest, the Court both 
assumes the possibility of legislative discontinuity and removes it from 
160. See U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
161. As noted in the discussion of reserved powers, supra section I.A, a state may only claim 
authority under the police powers when it acts to preserve the public health, safety, or morals. 
162. See Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 817-18 (1879) (stating the rule that action or 
inaction of prior legislatures does not bind a present legislature in the exercise of its police 
powers). 
163. See Sterk, supra note 139, at 674-75 (discussing early eminent domain doctrine as a 
departure from the Marshall Court's supremacy of contract model). 
164. 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507 (1848). For a full discussion of West River Bridge Co., see supra 
notes 50-55 and accompanying text. 
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the purview of the Contract Clause.165 Eminent domain thus effec-
tively eliminates a challenging party's expectation of permanence of a 
property interest.166 
Another of the reserved powers, the police power, imparts wide 
latitude to state legislatures in seeking to serve their citizens' inter-
ests.167 As between the prohibition on contractual impairment and the 
state's charge to promote the common weal, the courts have long rec-
ognized that the former must yield to the latter.168 That is, public 
interests trump private rights. A private party cannot escape the ef-
fects of a state's efforts to protect its citizenry under the police power, 
even by contracting concerning the subject matter of the new statute. 
In Stone v. Mississippi, 169 in which the Court upheld a law invalidating 
a lottery charter, the Court adopted the view that a party may not 
entrench an alienation of the police power. Despite the consequent 
uncertainty imposed on private actors by such a policy, the Stone 
Court's endorsement of this type of legislative discontinuity reflects 
the same concern for imprecise prediction expressed by the West River 
Bridge Co. Court. 
The Stone decision, like the opinion in West River Bridge Co., in-
vokes a concept of "implied understanding."170 Much as existing law 
165. 
It, then, being clear that the power in question not being within the purview of the restric-
tion imposed by the tenth section of the first article of the Constitution, it remains with the 
states to the full extent in which it inheres in every sovereign government .... This is, in 
truth, purely a question of power; and, conceding the power to reside in the State govern-
ment, this concession would seem to close the door upon all further controversy in connec-
tion with it. 
West River Bridge Co., 47 U.S. (6 How.) at 533. 
166. This is not to say, however, that a state may expropriate an individual's property with-
out limitation. The eminent domain power is subject to the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment. The state must compensate a private party for the property of which it was deprived. 
167. See, e.g., Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473, 480-81 (1905) ("While this power is sub-
ject to limitations in certain cases, there is wide discretion on the part of the legislature in deter-
mining what is and what is not necessary - a discretion which courts ordinarily will not 
interfere with."). 
168. See, e.g., 199 U.S. at 480 ("This power, which in its various ramifications is known as 
the police power, is an exercise of the sovereign right of the Government to protect the lives, 
health, morals, comfort and general welfare of the people, and is paramount to any rights under 
contracts between individuals."). 
169. 101 U.S. 814 (1879). For a full discussion of Stone, see supra notes 56-64 and accompa-
nying text. 
170. In light of the ever-present police power, "[a]ny one ... who accepts a lottery charter 
does so with the implied understanding that the people, in their sovereign capacity, and through 
their properly constituted agencies, may resume it at any time when the public good shall re-
quire, whether it be paid for or not." 101 U.S. at 821; cf. West River Bridge Co., 47 U.S. at 532-
33 (discussing the inherent power of the state to divest a party of her real property). 
Chief Justice Waite reconciled this portion of the holding with Trustees of Dartmouth Col-
lege v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819), by adverting to the part of that opinion stating 
"that the framers of the Constitution did not intend to restrain States in the regulation of their 
civil institutions, adopted for internal government, and that the instrument they have given us is 
not to be so construed." Stone, 101 U.S. at 820 (citing Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 
629). Because depriving the state of Mississippi of its police power would function as such a 
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is incorporated into every contract, 171 the Court read the police pow-
ers into those same contracts. In this way, both legal rules and "meta-
rules," like the police power and inalienability doctrine, become con-
structive terms of every contractual agreement. These metarules sub-
stantially limit a private party's ability legitimately to assert unfair 
surprise when the state acts under such rules. 
The heavily regulated industry doctrine reflects reserved power 
and inalienability concerns in its view of the legislature's necessary 
powers. As to reserved powers doctrine, the heavily regulated indus-
try doctrine adopts substantially the same methodology the Stone and 
West River Bridge Co. Courts employed. Apart from its similarity to 
the implied term logic in the reserved powers cases, the heavily regu-
lated industry doctrine provides for the same policy concerns involved 
in the earlier cases. The doctrine carves out areas in which the state 
has particularly strong interests, then gives the legislature free rein in 
those fields. The doctrine also draws upon inherent powers doctrine in 
that the HRID seeks to prevent entrenchment of prior legislative 
wishes due to party reliance. Under the doctrine, the Court considers 
the most recent statement of the legislative will to be effective, regard-
less of the government's prior position. Thus, individuals cannot rea-
sonably expect immunity from legislative changes. 
III. GOVERNMENTAL FIELD OCCUPATION 
In light of the issues discussed in Part II, this Part suggests an 
approach to Contract Clause problems that accounts both for the rea-
sonableness of party reliance and for the uncertainty inherent in any 
particular contractual context. This Note proposes that the reliance 
logic implicit in the heavily regulated industry doctrine applies beyond 
scenarios in which there is pervasive and historical state regulation. 
While the state creates uncertainty through heavy regulation, it also 
creates uncertainty by its need to exercise its substantive prerogatives 
such as the police power and eminent domain. The certainty with 
which a party contracts turns upon the legislature's interest in the sub-
ject matter of the contract. This Note terms the presence of such in-
terests field occupation. 
Under the field occupation model, a court will determine the pres-
ence of any unfair surprise solely by classifying a contract according to 
the nature and extent of state action in the field implicated by the con-
tract, existing as of the time of contracting. In this respect, field occu-
restraint, Waite asserted that the act at issue would fall within the exception to the Dartmautlz 
College rule. 
171. This is not to say that a private party may claim existing law as a contractual term for 
the purposes of reliance. Rather, legal rules are only implied terms for the purposes of making 
the contract something more than an unenforceable promise. To hold to a more expansive view 
of incorporation would impermissibly "limit the ability of state legislatures to amend their regu· 
latory legislation." General Motors Co. v. Romein, 112 S. Ct. 1105, 1111 (1992). 
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pation analysis is a test of legitimacy of the sort discussed in section 
H.B. A court will not look to each specific circumstance to determine 
an expectation's rationality. Rather, field occupation defines broad 
classes of legal instability in which an expectation of continuity will be 
illegitimate, or unreasonable. The model thus limits a court's analysis 
to finding whether a contract falls within an occupied area. The 
party's reliance will not be reasonable if the state has created sufficient 
uncertainty through the lawmaking process or even if such state action 
is likely to occur in the future. If a contract falls within such an area 
of uncertainty, no Contract Clause violation exists. 
Field occupation analysis both accounts for the state's need to act 
in the public interest, and provides a constant standard against which 
parties might judge the reasonableness of their reliance. In addition, 
the field occupation model casts off the balancing method the Court 
currently uses. Regardless of the substantiality of the contractual im-
pairment or the relative strengths of the public and private interests 
implicated, this test contemplates what a private party should expect 
in the way of government action. 
Field occupation appears in three forms: "heavy regulation," "re-
served powers" occupation, and "public purpose" occupation. Each 
of these three classifications of state action occupies a field in a differ-
ent manner yet, in all three, a private party's expectations of stability 
are inherently unreasonable. Sections III.A, IIl.B, and III.C discuss 
these forms of field occupation respectively. Each section describes 
the different methods of occupation and the effects on party expecta-
tions. Because this Note has already discussed heavy regulation and 
reserved powers at length, this Part analyzes them only briefly. Public 
purpose occupation receives fuller treatment. Section III.C explains 
that when, at the time of contracting, a transaction is imbued with a 
public nature or impacts on the public interest in a way which might 
give rise to state action, the market actor should foresee the 
probability of such action and the consequent possibility of contrac-
tual impairment. Even absent prior government action, sufficient un-
certainty exists under these circumstances to trump a reliance claim. 
Section III.C also suggests certain factors bearing the earmarks of 
public purpose field occupation that a court should consider in its de-
termination. Section III.D argues that the field occupation model pro-
vides several advantages over the Court's post-1934 approach. These 
advantages include consistency with the clause's original purpose, 
clearer standards for private conduct, and incentives for greater disci-
pline in legislative decisionmaking. 
A. Heavy Regulation 
The scenario that most visibly manifests the uncertainty or reason-
ableness thesis is the heavily regulated industry. In a context of heavy 
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regulation, the state "occupies" not only those matters within a field it 
specifically regulates, but all aspects of the field. 172 The state thus de-
fines the area as one in which it has a particular interest. Under the 
field occupation model, contracting parties constructively acknowl-
edge this prominent element of public control, as well as the uncer-
tainty it entails. 173 By placing the onus of accounting for legal change 
on the market actor, the field occupation model removes heavy regula-
tion from the purview of the Contract Clause. Thus, in the heavily 
regulated industry, the private actor suffers no unfair surprise by the 
introduction of "subsequent amendments to achieve the legislative 
end."174 
172. See supra section II.A. 
173. See supra section II.A. 
174. Federal Housing Admin. v. Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84, 91 (1958). The reader should 
note at this point that government contracts present an anomaly for the field occupation model. 
Under the model's reasoning, a government contract would fall somewhere in the range of a 
heavily regulated industry because the state speaks directly to subject matter of the contract. 
However, there are qualitative differences between regulation and contract which render the 
heavily regulated industry model inapplicable to a government contract scenario. In a regulation 
context, the state seeks to exercise its authority as an institution, thereby giving rise to "obliga· 
tion." In a contractual context, however, the state operates as any other private actor might 
operate. 
The truth is, States and cities, when they borrow money and contract to repay it with inter-
est, are not acting as sovereignties. They come down to the level of ordinary individuals .••. 
A promise to pay, with a reserved right to deny or change the effect of the promise, is an 
absurdity. 
Murray v. City of Charleston, 96 U.S. 432, 445 (1877). 
Although government contract contexts are qualitatively different from the others listed, one 
could argue that the field occupation model applies to government contracts. The state does not 
occupy a field by contracting in that industry. Rather, the state implicitly asserts that it does not 
seek to act in that area as an authority, but instead as a market actor. By surrendering its 
position of authority, the state affirmatively de-occupies, or vacates the field for the purposes of 
that transaction. The state thus contracts with an eye toward inducing reliance, giving rise to 
reasonable expectations. 
Although this inducement will not ab initio render a subsequent repeal invalid, City of El 
Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497 (1965) (holding statute modifying state's obligation only by limit· 
ing defaulting purchasers' ability to reclaim property does not violate Contract Clause); Faitoute 
Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502 (1942) (holding statute modifying state's 
own municipal bond obligation valid under the Blaisdell test), it will deprive the legislature of 
any claim that it sought to exercise dominion over an industry by the prior legislative action. An 
assertion of control of an area must arise from a condition or act outside of the contract. The 
courts have therefore treated parties differently based on the persona the state adopts in its ac-
tion. Cf. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 15, at 406-07. Courts will accord regulation prefer· 
ential treatment under the general rule, while scrutinizing modification of government contracts 
for validity on an act-by-act basis. 
By way of illustration, the reader might contrast United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 
U.S. 1 (1977), with the heavily regulated industry cases. In United States Trust, the Court's 
analysis focused on the notion that "a State is not completely free to consider impairing the 
obligations of its own contracts on a par with other policy alternatives. Similarly, a State is not 
free to impose a drastic impairment when an evident and more moderate course would serve its 
purposes equally well." 431 U.S. at 30-31. The circumstances surrounding the repeal did not 
justify the repeal in terms of either reasonableness or necessity. The Court thus invalidated the 
contractual impairment. The Court, in finding that the legislation violated the Contract Clause, 
emphasized the fact that the state sought to modify its own contractual obligations. 431 U.S. at 
23. Unlike other instances in which a state exercises its reserved powers to impose retroactive 
effects on market actors, a state's efforts to modify its own financial obligations does not deserve 
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Heavy regulation also presents the easiest case for the field occupa-
tion model. Here, the state's method of occupation is both active and 
apparent; an extensive scheme of regulation is in place and enforced. 
Parties are constructively aware of the state's interest in the field by 
virtue of their submission to these laws. While questions may arise 
concerning the breadth of the heavy regulation, a Contract Clause 
challenge will fail once a court finds that the private party has con-
tracted in a heavily regulated industry. 
An examination of Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & 
Light Co.175 from a field occupation standpoint illustrates how the 
model would treat HRID scenarios. In Energy Reserves Group, the 
Court upheld a Kansas statute regulating natural gas prices.176 As the 
Court noted in its opinion, natural gas producers had long been sub-
ject to "extensive and intrusive" state regulation. 177 For field occupa-
tion purposes, this fact alone would have removed the Kansas natural 
gas industry from the Contract Clause's zone of protection. The com-
prehensive nature of the legal scheme rendered unreasonable any ex-
pectation of legal consistency. In this respect, the model's treatment 
of Energy Reserves Group differs from the Court's. Although the 
Court considered such balancing factors as the extent of contractual 
impairment, the existence of a legitimizing public purpose, and the 
reasonableness of the impairment, 178 field occupation looks only to the 
presence of thorough state action to deny relief under the Contract 
Clause. 
B. Reserved Powers 
The field occupation model also requires a market actor to recog-
nize and account for the uncertainty created by the police and eminent 
domain powers. In this regard, the model relies on much the same 
logic as the implied term doctrine embodied in Stone v. Mississippi 179 
and West River Bridge Co. v. Dix. 180 The reader will recall that, in 
both these decisions, the Court read into all contracts a term that the 
state could at any time impair the contract in the exercise of the state's 
the degree of deference usually accorded such exercises. The Court therefore looked closely at 
the reasonableness and necessity of the repudiation of the state's obligation. 431 U.S. at 29-32 
("[A] State cannot refuse to meet its legitimate financial obligations simply because it would 
prefer to spend the money to promote the public good rather than the private welfare of its 
creditors."). 
Thus, in spite of the apparent ill fit of government contracts to the field occupation model, the 
area of government contracts in fact presents merely a special category for the model. 
175. 459 U.S. 400 (1983). 
176. 459 U.S. at 413-16. For a full discussion of Energy Reserves Group, see supra notes 119-
22 and accompanying text. 
177. 459 U.S. at 414 & n.18. 
178. 459 U.S. at 411-13. 
179. 101 U.S. 814, 821 (1879). 
180. 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507, 532 (1848). 
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reserved powers. 181 Regardless of a legislature's prior acts or prior 
failure to act, because the state holds inalienable power over matters of 
police and property, the state at all times occupies these fields. Even if 
the state should attempt explicitly to abandon one of these powers, a 
resumption of that power is wholly within the state's right. 182 All con-
tracts are subject to this continuing occupation. Thus, the field occu-
pation model invalidates a party's claim of unfair surprise should the 
exercise of a reserved power contravene an obligation in the party's 
contract. 
As with heavy regulation, a court can easily determine the consti-
tutionality of a reserved powers statute under the field occupation 
model. Although the reserved powers' manner of occupation is not 
necessarily active, the occupation is apparent. The powers of police 
and eminent domain are explicit and ever present. Unlike heavy regu-
lation, a private party does not acknowledge the reserved powers by 
conducting business in a regulated area. Rather, through their status 
as citizens in the constitutional scheme, market actors submit to the 
states' Tenth Amendment powers. 
If a court finds a contract to fall within a state's reserved powers, 
field occupation defines the contracting party's expectation of stability 
to be unreasonable and therefore unprotected. For instance, in Stone 
v. Mississippi, 183 the Court addressed a challenge to a statute revoking 
a lottery charter. Under the field occupation model, the Court would 
have determined whether lotteries were among those areas properly 
regulated under the police power. Upon finding that lotteries affect 
the health, safety, or morals of the populace, the Court would have 
upheld the legislation, because an expectation that the state could not 
exercise its police power is illegitimate and therefore unreasonable. 
Given the similarities between field occupation and implied term 
methodology, it is not surprising that this process is largely the same 
as that which the Court followed in Stone. 
C. Public Purpose Occupation 
Public purpose occupation is the third category of field occupation. 
Here, no prior state action or inalienable power supports a current 
exercise of state power. Nonetheless, an expectation that the legisla-
ture will not act still would be unreasonable under "public purpose 
occupation" if the court finds that the contract implicates important 
public concerns. The discussion below sets out some of the considera-
tions that would permit such a finding. 
As Blaisdell 184 and its progeny demonstrate, a greater possibility 
181. See supra section I.A. 
182. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
183. 101 U.S. 814 (1879). 
184. 290 U.S. 398 (1934) (discussed supra in notes 65-74 and accompanying text). 
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of unfair surprise exists when the state seeks to legislate in an area it 
has not traditionally controlled than in an area in which the state has 
previously declared its interest.185 These decisions, however, recog-
nize that states need to provide for the common weal in matters be-
sides health, safety, or morals.186 A state will have important interests 
in protecting itself and its citizenry in areas including, inter alia, em-
ployment relations, 187 environmental issues, 188 and economic hard-
ship.189 In this context the Court faces the need to allow the states "to 
protect their fundamental interests."19o 
While a legislature's efforts to "[e]nter[] a field it ha[s] never before 
sought to regulate"191 increase the likelihood of unfairness, this fact 
alone should not end the analysis.192 The legislature still suffers from 
a "bias toward the near"193 and all the frailties entailed in prospective 
decisionmaking.194 An absolute bar against retroactive lawmaking be-
yond reserved powers and heavy regulation would ignore this phe-
nomenon and ultimately deprive the state of an important, perhaps 
necessary, power. 
To avoid such a result, the Court has opted to engage in an ad hoc 
185. See, e.g., Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 245-47 (1978) (discuss-
ing the absence of state regulation in the area as giving rise to unfair surprise). 
186. See supra section I.B. 
187. See General Motors Corp. v. Romein, 112 S. Ct. 1105 (1992). 
188. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987). 
189. See Home Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934). 
190. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 443-44. 
191. Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 249 (1978). 
192. It may strike the reader as perverse that when a prior legislature has not passed legisla-
tion in a field that it binds its successors, while prior enactments free a successor legislature to 
act. See Eule, supra note 153, at 452-53 (contrasting Allied Steel and Vebc). 
Professor Eule refers to these unregulated fields as "vacant lots." One problem Eule finds 
regarding vacant lots is whether they are left vacant by "design or by inattention." Id. at 453. 
"The task, therefore, is one of giving content to legislative silence. Should a history of legislative 
inactivity be construed to signal approval of the status quo or treated as devoid of meaning? 
Imparting content to the failure to speak is surely among the most futile of endeavors." Id. 
(footnote omitted). 
Let us assume, however, that, prior to the enactment of the statute in Allied Steel, in which 
the Court struck down a Minnesota law modifying existing pension agreements, all employers 
similar to Allied had pension plans roughly along the lines mandated by the statute. At that 
time, then, the industry norm is the same as that dictated by the new law. In this context, how 
could Allied assert that legislative silence endorsed its extant plan? The maintenance of the 
status quo rationale would not help here. 
Let us further assume that, without directly dictating conduct, the state provided incentives 
to employers to adopt plans similar to those later mandated. There is regulatory silence on the 
matter, but the state has a clearly enunciated policy preference. The only basis for reliance a 
market actor might have in this context is the expectation that compliance with the policy would 
remain voluntary. It is unclear whether the Court would have found reasonable reliance in Al-
lied Steel given these hypothetical facts. However, the element of uncertainty introduced by the 
government action makes such a finding much more strained than it would be in the absence of 
that action. 
193. See PARFIT, supra note 137, at 159. 
194. See supra section 11.C.1. 
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balancing of public and private interests. The factors enumerated in 
Energy Reserves Group permit a state to serve its legitimate ends when 
the contractual impairment is insubstantial, when the law serves a sig-
nificant public purpose, and when the means are narrowly tailored to 
the ends.195 These factors, however, contemplate issues beyond those 
for which a party might provide in a risk calculus, and thereby disre-
gard the Contract Clause's purpose of protecting reasonable 
expectations.196 
The question then becomes how to provide for public initiatives 
while maintaining consistency with the clause's focus on expectations. 
In order to account adequately for the state's need to effect important 
public policies, the Court should force the private actor to consider the 
societal effects of the transactions into which it enters. Such a practice 
will inform the party's prediction of potential future government 
action. 
The relevant concern for the field occupation model is the "public 
purpose" element. The model's view of reliance would require a court 
to consider the potential public effects of a private party's business 
when that business or class of business affects or might foreseeably 
affect the broader public interest at the time of contracting. Although 
any transaction will entail some externalities, field occupation looks 
only to those enterprises that affect broad classes of state interests. 
For instance, if a private party conducts business in a field that affects 
great numbers of people or substantially affects a somewhat lesser 
number, that party should reasonably predict that the legislature 
might likely regulate the field at some point. Further, the model en-
courages the market actor to look beyond her own operations to the 
industry as a whole. A practice of a single market actor might not 
significantly affect broad sectors, but that practice applied on an indus-
try-wide basis might do so. The larger the segment of the population 
the actor affects by her practices, products, or employment, the greater 
the likelihood that the state will have an interest in regulating that 
actor. By recognizing the public nature of a market actor's transac-
tions, this portion of the field occupation model carves out an area in 
whichforeseeable, potential state action destroys the reasonableness of 
an expectation of legal stability. 
Public purpose occupation provides the most difficult context for 
the field occupation model. In contrast to both heavy regulation and 
reserved powers occupation, this category's manner of occupation is 
both inactive and latent. There is no prior legislative activity in the 
195. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
196. For instance, an examination of whether a statute substantially impairs a market actor's 
contract ignores the issue whether that impairment might reasonably have been expected. 
Rather, this element of the Court's test would legitimize a state act on the basis of increments of 
effect. 
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area, and no broad legal rule or convention exists to notify a party of a 
state interest. Therefore, a court's determination of public purpose oc-
cupation will entail line drawing on a case-by-case basis more fre-
quently than will the other two forms of occupation. Once a court 
finds a field occupied, however, the court will treat the contract the 
same way it would a heavy regulation or reserved powers contract. 
Under the model, the contract will not receive Contract Clause 
protection. 
Given the considerations listed above, the Court may have wrongly 
decided Allied Structural Steel v. Spannaus, where it struck down a 
Minnesota pension law that impaired prior pension agreements.197 
Although no prior state regulation governed the pension plans at issue 
in Allied Steel, various factors may have suggested that Allied had 
reason to expect regulation. For instance, if operations involving one 
hundred or more employees employed the majority of the citizens of 
Minnesota, the public nature of the employment relations would give 
rise to a corresponding legislative interest. Further, if the industry 
practice in pension plans did not serve the needs of employees as well 
as the Allied plan did, Allied should have recognized this fact. Allied 
should then have incorporated into its risk calculus the possibility that 
the public effects of the industry practice would instigate regulation. 
Finally, because employee-protection regulation was pervasive, Allied 
might reasonably have expected that pension plans specifically would 
become a subject of such regulation.19s Although the presence of a 
single one of these factors might or might not have given rise to a field 
occupation in Allied Steel, an examination of the totality of the cir-
cumstances surrounding Allied's contract demonstrates that Allied's 
expectations were perhaps unreasonable. 
This approach to "vacant lot" scenarios permits the state to exer-
cise its powers retroactively in fields not previously designated as occu-
pied, but only when that exercise serves a sufficiently public purpose. 
Further, it does so in a manner geared toward the Contract Clause's 
original purpose of protecting reasonable expectations. The model 
creates a central focus for Contract Clause jurisprudence, thereby do-
ing away with the current piecemeal standard in favor of a more holis-
tic approach. 
D. Field Occupation versus Balancing 
The field occupation model provides several benefits over a balanc-
ing standard. First, by focusing 9n reliance, field occupation main-
tains a methodological continuity with the pre-Blaisdell decisions. 
197. For a full discussion of Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978), see 
supra notes 88-95 and accompanying text. 
198. See Allied Steel, 438 U.S. at 261 n.8 (Brennan, J. dissenting) (indicating the pervasive-
ness of employee-protection regulation). 
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Indeed, field occupation functions as a natural extension of the re-
served powers decisions in the mid- to late-nineteenth century. The 
model's adoption of essentially an implied term rationale flows from 
Stone and West River Bridge Co. in a manner that achieves Blaisdell's 
goal of permitting a broader range of state action, but without the 
"modern" methodology. 
Further, the field occupation model imposes on both individuals 
and legislatures a measure of rigor the balancing standard fails to pro-
vide. In order to state a Contract Clause claim under the model, mar-
ket actors must ensure before entering a transaction that they have 
considered all relevant factors. Not only must they contemplate prior 
government action, they must also account for potential public effects 
of their enterprises. Legislatures, without the ever-present possibility 
of winning in a court's balancing of interests, will have an incentive to 
exercise greater care in drafting statutes to avoid defeating reasonable 
expectations. Although states still enjoy broad latitude under the field 
occupation model, legislatures, if their regulations impair contracts, 
must ensure that their product addresses matters of public import, and 
even then, matters which a market actor should have expected upon 
entering into a transaction to be public in nature. 
Finally, field occupation provides broad and clear standards on 
which an actor might base her risk calculus. In spite of its tolerance of 
uncertainty, the model injects greater certainty into the judiciary's 
treatment of Contract Clause challenges than does the current balanc-
ing test. The model limits the judicial discretion entailed in the post-
Blaisdell Contract Clause jurisprudence, in which the clause's applica-
bility depends largely on who conducts the balancing. Although some 
discretion remains in a court's definition of public purpose occupation, 
the field occupation model provides a measure of predictability and 
consistency absent from recent decisions. 
CONCLUSION 
With its adoption of a balancing test to address Contract Clause 
problems, the Supreme Court has diverged from the clause's purpose 
of protecting expectations. This departure from the Court's early reli-
ance-based approach has deprived the clause of the clarity and cer-
tainty it once possessed. 
One element of the Court's current test, however, represents a re-
turn to an emphasis on reasonable expectations. The heavily regulated 
industry doctrine reasons that a private actor who conducts business 
in an area subject to a pervasive legal scheme cannot expect to avoid 
the effects of a change in that scheme. The doctrine rests on the no-
tion that in order for a reliance claim to receive Contract Clause pro-
tection, that reliance must at least be "reasonable." Further, the 
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doctrine finds its roots in the fluid nature of a popular sovereign, as 
well as in the legislature's inalienable powers. 
Using the heavily regulated industry doctrine as a springboard, the 
above analysis demonstrates the Supreme Court should predicate its 
treatment of all Contract Clause challenges on whether the state has 
asserted or was likely to assert control over a field. This control may 
manifest itself in three ways, ranging from "heavy regulation," 
whereby the state governs substantially all aspects of a field, to "re-
served powers," when the Constitution grants to the state power over 
a field, to "public purpose" occupation, under which the state has an 
interest in a field and therefore might foreseeably regulate a matter. 
Although the Court has never based a decision entirely on this aspect 
of a legislative act, the opinions are generally consistent with the per-
spective taken in the field occupation model, if only because the Court 
has never invalidated a statute aimed at a heavily regulated industry. 
In determining the legitimacy of a party's assertion of unfair sur-
prise, the model suggests that the Court should require that party, 
when engaging in her risk calculus, to look beyond the isolated trans-
action to the possibility of governmental action. A requirement of ad-
equate, though not necessarily accurate, prediction accords with the 
Contract Clause's original purpose of protecting reasonable expecta-
tions, while permitting the state to legislate in areas it deems necessary 
to serve the public good. 
The field occupation model provides a coherent basis for the 
Court's determination of reasonableness in light of its dual goals. By 
delineating zones of uncertainty, the model simplifies the Contract 
Clause test to the issue of reliance. Further, by recognizing the vari-
ous factors a party should consider in its risk calculus, it puts market 
actors on notice as to the possibility of legislative interference with 
their contracts when the public character of those contracts is suffi-
ciently great. 
